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During the past two decades, there has been a dramatic change in IPO activity around the world. Though
vibrant IPO activity, attributed to better institutions and governance, used to be a strength of the U.S.,
it no longer is. IPO activity in the U.S. has fallen compared to the rest of the world and U.S. firms
go public less than expected based on the economic importance of the U.S. In the early 1990s, the
declining U.S. IPO share was due to the extraordinary growth of IPOs in foreign countries; in the 2000s,
however, it is due to higher IPO activity abroad combined with lower IPO activity in the U.S. Global
IPOs, which are IPOs in which some of the proceeds are raised outside the firm’s home country, play
a critical role in the increase in IPO activity outside the U.S. The quality of a country’s institutions
is positively related to its domestic IPO activity and negatively related to its global IPO activity. However,
home country institutions are more important in explaining IPO activity in the 1990s than in the 2000s.
The evidence is consistent with the view that access to global markets helps firms overcome the obstacles
of poor institutions. Finally, we show that the dynamics of global IPO activity and country-level IPO
activity are strongly affected by global factors.
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It is widely believed that a vibrant market for initial public offerings (IPOs) is an asset of the U.S. 
Black and Gilson (1998) and many others argue that the existence of such a market plays a critical role in 
facilitating entrepreneurship and venture capital in the U.S. economy. This view permeates corporate 
finance textbooks. For example, Megginson and Smart (2009) write: “Given its role in providing capital 
market access for entrepreneurial growth companies, the U.S. initial public offering market is widely 
considered a vital economic and financial asset.” The law and finance literature shows that IPO activity 
depends on country-level laws and governance institutions. It also shows that IPO activity is higher in 
common law countries compared to countries with other legal origins. From this perspective, IPO activity 
has been vibrant in the U.S. because of better laws and better governance institutions. 
In this paper, we show that there has been a striking evolution over time in IPO activity across 
countries. We build a comprehensive sample of 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries constituting almost $2.6 
trillion (constant 2007 U.S. dollars) of capital raised over 1990 to 2007. Although the worldwide share of 
IPO activity by U.S. firms still ranks near the top, during the 2000s, U.S. IPOs have not kept up with the 
economic importance of the U.S. In the 1990s, the yearly average of the number of U.S. IPOs comprised 
27% of all IPOs in the world while the U.S. accounted for 27% of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Since 2000, the U.S. share of  all IPOs has fallen to 12% whereas its share of worldwide GDP has 
averaged 30%. The average size of a typical IPO in the U.S. is larger than that in the rest of the world so 
that IPO proceeds may be a more relevant metric. Yet, in the last five years of our sample, IPO proceeds 
raised  by  U.S.  firms  drop  to  16.2%  of  world  IPO  proceeds,  despite  the  fact  that  the  stock  market 
capitalization of the U.S. relative to that of the world averages 41% during this period. 
Some of the decrease in the importance of U.S. IPO activity compared to worldwide IPO activity is 
due to lower IPO activity by U.S. firms, but much of it is explained by the considerable growth of IPOs in 
other countries that occurs throughout the sample period. To a large extent, this growth is fueled by the 
emergence of global IPOs, which include both IPOs in which some of the shares are sold outside the 
home country of the firm going public, and foreign IPOs in which of all the shares are sold outside the 
home country. In 2007, proceeds raised in global IPOs accounted for 61% of total IPO proceeds, which is 2 
double the fraction raised in 1990. U.S. firms have never been active participants in the global IPO 
marketplace. This newer global IPO phenomenon is an important tool  linked to the globalization of 
capital markets. 
The law and finance literature that started with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(hereafter LLSV, 1997, 1998) focuses on how differences in countries‟ laws and governance institutions 
can  explain  differences  in  IPO  activity  across  countries.  However,  these  papers  study  domestic  IPO 
activity in a world with limited financial globalization. Hence, it is an open question as to how IPO 
activity is related to home country laws and governance in a world with dramatically reduced barriers to 
international investment and trade in financial services. Indeed, a newer literature, which includes Shleifer 
and Wolfenzon (hereafter SW, 2002), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (hereafter DKS, 2007), and Stulz (2009) 
addresses the impact of financial globalization on IPO activity and suggests that home country laws and 
governance institutions may have opposite effects on domestic compared to global IPOs. That is, global 
IPOs can be used to overcome the adverse effects of poor home country institutions. In addition, we 
would expect that home country institutions should be less important in a more global world as firms can 
benefit from institutions and resources from other countries in their governance, even if they do not go 
public through a global IPO (Stulz, 1999). For instance, because of globalization, firms that go public in 
their own country can now use foreign accounting firms, law firms, and investment banks. The IPO 
literature emphasizes the importance of certification of the issuing firm (Ritter and Welch, 2002) and the 
use of foreign advisers and monitors can help certify the quality of the issuing firm in a more credible 
way than local advisers and monitors. We would expect the effect of globalization to be more powerful in 
the  second  half  of  our  sample  period  and  hence  expect  that  home  country  laws  and  governance 
institutions are less relevant in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. 
We investigate three separate questions to try to understand cross-country IPO activity around the 
world, its evolution over time, and the role of financial globalization. First, our sample makes it possible 
for  us  to  conduct  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  role  of  country  institutions  for  the  cross-country 
variation of domestic IPOs. Second, our sample period allows us to consider separately the 1990s and the 3 
2000s, so that we can examine whether the role of institutions has changed over time as the world became 
more financially globalized. Finally, we investigate the relation between global IPO activity by firms 
from a country and the institutions of that country, expecting that global IPO activity will be negatively 
related to a country‟s laws and governance. 
There are many theories of the decision to go public (see Ritter, 2003 for a review), but most of these 
theories ignore differences in laws and governance across countries. SW (2002) provide the archetypal 
model of how a country‟s laws and governance affect the benefits and costs of going public for the 
owners of firms and hence affect the likelihood that a firm will go public in a given country. In their 
model, the problem for public firms is that the controlling shareholder can extract private benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders. However, minority shareholders buy shares at the IPO at fair value so 
that  any  expected  private  benefit  consumption  reduces  IPO  proceeds.  At  one  extreme,  laws  and 
governance are so poor that any money provided by outside shareholders is consumed in private benefits. 
In such a situation, no IPO is possible. At the other extreme, if laws and their enforcement are so strong 
that no private benefits are consumed, firms that go public have high values and all entrepreneurs with 
positive NPV projects can go public. In reality, countries are between these extremes. Private benefits are 
lower in countries with good laws and good governance, so that in these countries the equity of firms is 
worth more and more firms benefit from going public. 
Stulz (2009) adds an intermediate period to the SW model, where the entrepreneur has information 
that outside shareholders do not have about whether it makes sense to continue undertaking the firm‟s 
project. The entrepreneur benefits from continuing the project even when its NPV has become negative 
because he can extract private benefits upon completion of the project. Because of this problem, firms 
raise less capital at the IPO unless they find ways to credibly commit to continuing the project only if it 
has a positive NPV. Stulz shows that a credible disclosure commitment can perform that role, but that 
laws must make it possible for outside shareholders to act if the news disclosed is adverse about the 
project. 4 
We  test  these  predictions  from  the  SW  (2002)  and  Stulz  (2009)  models  using  several  different 
country-level proxies for laws, governance, and disclosure (hereafter “institutions”). Countries with better 
institutions have more domestic IPO activity, measured as either the annual number of domestic IPOs 
scaled by the lagged number of domestic listed firms or as the annual proceeds raised in domestic IPOs 
scaled by lagged GDP. Firms can supplement country institutions through commitments to firm-level 
governance. DKS (2007) show that firms‟ investments in corporate governance depend critically on a 
country‟s economic development, financial development, and openness. When economic and financial 
development  is  high,  investment  in  governance  is  cheaper  and  more  effective,  so  that  a  country‟s 
institutions are less important. We account for a country‟s per capita GDP, stock market capitalization to 
GDP ratio, and stock market turnover to measure the level of economic and financial development. Our 
results hold after controlling for these measures of economic and financial development. 
The  free  flow  of  capital  globally  allows  firms  to  raise  funds  publicly  outside  their  country  of 
domicile. By all measures, finance became much more global when one compares the 2000s before the 
global financial crisis of 2008-2009 to the 1980s. In the 1980s, many countries with viable stock markets 
were actually closed to capital flows (see Karolyi and Stulz, 2003). Very few of these countries were still 
closed or had substantial obstacles to capital flows in the 2000s. In the models of DKS (2007) and Stulz 
(2009), financial market globalization allows firms to borrow the institutions of foreign countries. Firms 
from countries with weaker institutions should benefit more because they can raise capital on better terms. 
Therefore, we expect that such firms are more likely to go public with a global IPO and to raise more 
proceeds in foreign markets. Measuring annual global IPO activity by firms in a given country as either 
the number of global IPOs to the total number of IPOs or as global IPO proceeds to total IPO proceeds, 
we find strong support for the prediction that countries with weaker institutions have more global IPO 
activity. These findings are robust to controlling for other important determinants of IPO activity. 
The importance of home country institutions for the extent of IPO activity can change over time with 
improved technology and  with growing financial globalization. The models of SW (2002) and DKS 
(2007)  predict  that  with  more  capital  market  openness  and  globalization,  the  role  of  home  country 5 
institutions for domestic IPO activity will diminish in importance. Specifically, DKS predict that the role 
of institutions for IPO activity, conditional on the level of financial and economic development, is lower 
when global markets are more accessible. To test this prediction, we compare the impact of the national 
institutions variables on IPO activity in the 1990s and the 2000s. The institutions of the country in which 
a firm is located are less important for explaining domestic IPO activity in the 2000s compared to the 
1990s. For instance, while common law countries have significantly more IPO activity in the 1990s than 
other countries, they do not in the 2000s. We also offer some evidence that home country institutions 
became a less important factor for the decision to pursue a global IPO in the 2000s when global markets 
became more accessible for more firms from many more countries. But these results are weaker than 
those for domestic IPO activity. 
The  literature  on  time-series  variation  in  IPO  activity  focuses  mostly  on  changes  in  growth 
opportunities and market conditions. Ritter‟s (2003) survey points out that extreme swings in the volume 
of IPOs are of considerable interest and that the volume seems to be “hypersensitive to changes in market 
conditions” (p. 293). Lowry (2003) addresses why IPO volume fluctuates so much and concludes that 
changes  in  aggregate  capital  demands  of  private  firms  and  in  investor  optimism  are  the  primary 
determinants.  Pagano,  Panetta,  and  Zingales  (1998)  find  that,  for  a  sample  of  Italian  IPOs,  the 
predominant reason firms go public is to rebalance their capital structure and to exploit mispricing, rather 
than to raise capital for financing investments. Loughran and Ritter (1995) also find support for the 
market timing explanation for U.S. IPOs, while Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) find similar 
results internationally. To capture changing local and global market conditions, we control for country-
level Tobin‟s q (adjusted by the industry composition in that country), a global measure of q, as well as 
domestic and global world IPO factors. 
Our tests and findings are new, but our effort is related to and adds to several recent papers. First, 
LLSV (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter LLS, 2006), and Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (hereafter DLLS, 2008) show that legal protections for minority investors 
through rules and enforcement, as well as securities laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private 6 
enforcement, are associated with more IPO activity (on average, between 1996 and 2000). We use their 
legal protection and securities law measures, but we also capture the important dynamics of IPO activity 
over  time  in  conjunction  with  changing  investment  opportunities  and  with  financial  globalization, 
especially in the 2000s. Further, we distinguish between domestic and global IPOs. Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) use a broad sample of 17,226 IPOs from 38 countries to examine firms‟ motives for going public. 
They  find  that  IPO  proceeds  are  predominantly  used  to  finance  investments  and  that  there  are  few 
differences in the use of IPO proceeds between firms in common law and civil law countries. Caglio, 
Weiss Hanley, and Marietta-Westberg (2010) show that global IPOs account for a significant fraction of 
total IPO proceeds. They show that characteristics of firms that choose a global offer are different from 
those that choose a domestic offer and that global IPOs originate from countries with lower bond and 
stock market development. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our data and calibrates it with 
other databases on IPO activity around the world. Section II provides a number of new empirical facts 
about how cross-country IPO activity is changing over time. We then evaluate in a panel framework how 
important institutions, financial and economic development, and market conditions are for the variation in 
domestic IPO activity in Section III. Financial globalization and the role of institutions in influencing the 
expansion of foreign and global IPOs are examined in Section IV. Conclusions follow. 
 
I. The IPO sample and country-level data. 
A.  IPO data. 
We obtain IPO data from the Securities Data Company‟s (SDC) Global New Issues Database. For 
each IPO, this database provides information on the issuer, the issue date, total proceeds, the number and 
type of shares offered, the offer price, whether the issue is domestic only or contains an international 
tranche, and whether or not a tranche is offered to public or private investors. We begin by downloading 
all transactions in SDC where the IPO flag is set to “yes.” Because SDC has very limited coverage for 
non-U.S. offers prior to 1990, our sample begins in January 1990. The sample ends in December 2007. 7 
The initial count is 38,724 observations. We eliminate transactions with a single domestic tranche that 
SDC flags as a private placement (57 observations). There are 526 cases where there is more than one 
transaction reported in SDC for the same firm within a narrow window of time. Many of these are global 
IPOs where the domestic and international tranches have different issue dates, usually within a few days 
of each other. We drop 235 observations with a gap of 30 days or more between issue dates. Following 
Kim and Weisbach (2008), we remove 48 transactions that do not contain any information on proceeds 
raised. The data for some IPOs is recorded over multiple lines in SDC, even if there is only one tranche in 
the offering. We consolidate these issues into one line and drop 1,347 observations. Some foreign, and all 
global offers, are also recorded over multiple lines in SDC. We consolidate that information into one line 
and drop the 3,638 duplicate records. We also drop 93 transactions that do not have SIC codes, leaving us 
with 33,306 observations, each of which represents a unique IPO. 
To construct our final sample, we exclude an additional 3,945 IPOs. We drop 3,856 IPOs by REITs 
and investment funds, 44 IPOs where the country of origin has no data (more details below, but they 
include tax havens like the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, etc.), and 45 IPOs from 16 countries 
for which there were no domestic IPOs (only global IPOs) during the 18-year sample period.
1,2 The final 
sample contains 29,361 IPOs from 89 different countries of which 24,122 are purely domestic and 5,239 
are foreign only (international offerings with no domestic tranche) and global offers (both domestic and 
foreign tranches included). 
We perform two experiments to lend assurance that our SDC sample is a reliable representation of 
IPO activity around the world. In one experiment, we collected data from the World Federation of Stock 
Exchanges (WFE). Each year, the WFE surveys their member, affiliate, and correspondent exchanges on 
a wide range of statistics, including what they call “investment flows”. This includes new companies that 
list and the new capital that they raise via shares. The WFE provides a list of definitions and calculation 
methods  that  the  exchanges  must  follow  to  increase  the  comparability  of  the  information  across 
                                                 
1 The following SIC codes were used to screen out REITs and investment funds: 6722, 6722, 6726, 6798, and 6799. 
2 Countries with no domestic IPOs are: Angola, Barbados, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Faroe Islands, Georgia, 
Ghana, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macau, Malta, Netherlands Antilles, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uruguay. 8 
exchanges (see www.world-exchanges.org/statistics). We obtained this data for 2001 through 2005 for 
each country and compared it with our IPO counts and proceeds totals from SDC. The general finding is 
that SDC and WFE have comparable coverage and reporting for many countries. North American and 
U.K. totals are close, as are those for most Asian countries, such as Singapore, China, and Hong Kong. 
There  are  patterns  of  SDC  under-reporting  of  counts  and  proceeds  in  Australia,  India,  Italy,  Spain, 
Sweden,  and  Switzerland.  Of  course,  there  may  be  good  reasons  for  these  differences,  such  as  the 
inclusion of investment funds and REITs in the WFE samples. Additional complications arise in the 
WFE‟s data with the consolidation of exchanges, such as NYSE Euronext and OMX Nasdaq, as they 
centralize their reporting relationship with the WFE. The WFE does not report the composition of IPOs 
by type. 
We also collected IPO data from Bloomberg and from the home-market exchanges for four randomly 
chosen countries (Brazil, Canada, Germany, and Malaysia) from the early 1980s through 2007. In each 
case, we also obtained information on domestic and foreign IPOs, but only by counts not proceeds. For 
Germany from 1997 to the present, the SDC counts are almost identical to those reported by the Deutsche 
Börse on their website. Those for Bloomberg are higher (about 50% discrepancy on average); they report 
more than double the count in 2005-2006 relative to the Deutsche Börse and SDC.
3 For Malaysia, the IPO 
counts in Bloomberg are very similar to those from the Bursa Malaysia website and SDC (less than 5% 
discrepancy on average). The WFE reports a much higher count for Brazil‟s Bovespa than Bloomberg and 
SDC, though the latter two are similar (about 30% discrepancy on average). Finally, for Canada, the 
Bloomberg counts are on average 40% lower than for SDC which are, in turn, about 20% higher than 
those reported to the WFE. The biggest count discrepancies occur during 2000 and 2001. 
   
                                                 
3  Each  of  the  81  German  IPOs  listed  in  Bloomberg  in  2005  were  manually  checked  and  several  firms  (e.g., 
Bertelsmann, IC Immobilien, Marenave Schiffahrts, and Qsil) were not on the Deutsche Börse website. These firms 
had announced plans to do an IPO, but subsequently announced that they would defer the IPO due to restructuring 
or other reasons. Bloomberg appears to rely on corporate news releases and prospectuses. 9 
B.  Country level data. 
In our regressions, the dependent variable is a measure of IPO activity. For each country, each year, 
we compute the number of IPOs (“IPO counts”) as well as the total proceeds raised in IPOs (“IPO 
proceeds”). To compute the IPO counts and proceeds, we distinguish between domestic IPOs and global 
IPOs.  To  benchmark  IPO  activity  across  countries  that  differ  in  size,  we  scale  the  IPO  counts  and 
proceeds raised each year by the lagged number of publicly-listed domestic companies and by lagged 
GDP, respectively, in the country of domicile. These data are obtained from the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) Database. Listed domestic companies include domestically incorporated 
companies listed on the country‟s stock exchanges at the end of the year and do not include investment 
companies, mutual funds, REITs or other collective investment vehicles. GDP is reported in current U.S. 
dollars converted from domestic currencies using the end-of-year official exchange rate for that country. 
An important set of data in our work are country-specific institutional variables related to the quality 
of  investor  legal  protections  and  securities  laws  related  to  disclosure  requirements  and  enforcement 
standards. From LLSV (1998), it is well-known that common law countries have better institutions. We 
therefore use the common law dummy introduced by LLSV (1998) and extended in DLLS (2008). It 
equals one if the origin of commercial law in a country is English common law, and zero, otherwise 
(“Common law”). A popular index of legal protections for minority investors is the anti-director rights 
index (“Anti-director”) of LLSV (1998) and updated and revised by DLLS (2008) based on laws that 
apply to firms in 2003. The index is formed on a six-point scale based on a set of variables meant to 
capture the stance of corporate law towards shareholder protection.
4 DLLS (2008) build an index of anti-
self-dealing (“Anti-self dealing”) to address the ways in which the law deals with corporate self-dealing 
in a more theoretically grounded way. It is assembled by means of a 2003 survey of Lex Mundi law firms 
in  72  countries  and  includes  components  related  to  ex  ante  private  control  of  self-dealing,  such  as 
disclosures that counterparties in a transaction must disclose before approval is granted by disinterested 
                                                 
4 Spamann (2010) also re-codes the original anti-director rights index used in LLSV (1998). He does not report data 
for all countries in his sample, so we do not employ this alternative index. 10 
shareholders as well as similar ex post disclosures (such as access to evidence) for independent reviews of 
transactions after completion toward possible rescission or follow-on suits. 
LLS (2006) show that securities laws that mandate prospectus disclosure and prospectus liability 
benefit stock market development, including the breadth, size, and liquidity of the market. They devise 
measures based on a survey of attorneys in 49 countries in 2000. These measures are especially useful for 
our  study  as  they  relate  closely  to  the  security  issuance  process  in  IPOs.  They  build  a  disclosure 
requirements index (“Disclosure”) with components related to requirements for prospectuses, and for 
providing information on compensation of directors and key officers, the issuer‟s ownership structure, 
related-party transactions with directors, officers or large blockholders, and the presence of contracts 
outside  the  ordinary  course  of  business.  The  liability  standard  index  (“Burden  of  proof”)  comprises 
measures of four liability standards in cases against issuers and directors, distributors, and accountants. 
The  index  of  public  enforcement  (“Public  enforcement”)  is  based  on  five  broad  aspects  of  public 
enforcement: the basic characteristics of the supervisory body for securities markets, the scope of its 
powers  to  regulate  markets,  its  investigative  powers,  its  power  to  issue  noncriminal  sanctions  for 
violations of securities laws against issuers distributors, and accountants, and whether, to whom, and 
when criminal sanctions for violations of securities laws apply. Finally, LLS build an all-encompassing 
investor protection index (“Investor protection”) which is the first principal component of the burden of 
proof, disclosure, and the anti-director rights index from LLSV (1998). 
We  also  include  a  measure  of  the  rule  of  law  (“Rule  of  law”)  from  the  World  Bank‟s  World 
Governance Indicators database
5 and political risk (“Political risk”) from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database built by The PRS Group, Inc. In contrast to the LLSV and DLLS variables, these 
variables are measured every year. The former captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by rules related to contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts 
as well as likelihood of crime and violence. It is based on a survey of public and private sector experts 
and is available for over 200 countries since 1996, including annually from 2002.  The political risk 
                                                 
5 For details on methodology and analytical issues, see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). 11 
variable  from  ICRG  includes  components  related  to  government  stability,  socioeconomic  conditions, 
internal  and  external conflicts, corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and bureaucratic 
quality. It is scored on a 100-point scale and is available annually from 1990. This political risk variable 
serves as a proxy for the quality of country governance. To the extent that countries with high political 
risk are countries where public firms are more at risk of predation from the state (Stulz, 2005), we would 
expect IPO activity to be weaker in such countries. 
A  key  mechanism  through  which  poor  institutions  limit  IPO  activity  in  the  literature  we  have 
discussed is that they require more co-investment by insiders at the IPO. Consequently, we would expect 
fewer IPOs in countries where ownership is optimally more concentrated. We use a measure of ownership 
concentration (“Ownership”) from LLSV (1998), which is computed as the average percentage of shares 
owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest, nonfinancial, private domestic firms in a country. 
In our regressions, we also include measures of development. To measure the level of economic 
development in the country, we use the log of GDP per capita (“Log(GDP / capita)”). This variable is 
obtained from the WDI Database. For measures of financial market development, we use the 2008 update 
of  the  Financial  Development  and  Structure  database,  originally  used  in  Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt,  and 
Levine (2000). We collect data for the stock market turnover ratio (“Market turnover”, the ratio of the 
value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization) and stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP (“Market cap / GDP”, the value of listed shares to GDP). 
To control for local market conditions as a factor in the going-public decision, we compute a country-
level measure of Tobin‟s q each year. At the firm level, q is computed from data obtained from Thomson 
Reuter‟s Worldscope database as follows: the numerator is total assets less the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity. For the denominator, we use the book value of total assets. All variables are in 
local currency. Using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme, we compute the median q and 
relative market value for each industry annually. The country-level measure of q (“Country q”) is the 
market value weighted average of the median industry qs. This measure is constructed analogously to the 
local growth opportunities (LGO) measure based on P/E ratios used in Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 12 
Siegel  (2007).  To  control  for  global  growth  opportunities,  we  also  construct  a  global  measure  of  q 
(“Global q”). Each year we compute the median q and the relative market value for each global industry 
(includes all firms worldwide in that industry). Global q is the market value weighted average of the 
global median industry qs. This measure is the parallel to Bekaert et al.‟s global growth opportunities 
(GGO) measure. 
Finally, to control for unobservable global macroeconomic and capital market factors that influence 
IPO activity around the world, we construct a world IPO factor. It is computed separately for domestic 
IPOs (“World domestic IPO rate”) and global IPOs (“World global IPO rate”) and is measured either in 
terms of IPO counts per listed firms or in terms of IPO proceeds per GDP. Each year, total world IPO 
counts (proceeds) are summed across countries and scaled by the lagged total number of listed firms 
worldwide (lagged total GDP). To compute the world IPO rate for a given country, the IPO activity and 
the scale factor (either number of listed firms or GDP) of that country is excluded. 
Summary statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations among these measures are 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
II. The rise of the IPO abroad and the fall of the IPO in the U.S. 
Table 1, Panel a presents the total number of IPOs and breaks it down by domestic IPOs and global 
IPOs by year. Annual IPO counts increased from less than 1,000 in the early 1990s to a peak of 3,100 in 
1996. They fell after 1996 before reaching another peak of 2,117 in 2000. The counts fall below 1,000 for 
three years after 2000 before increasing again steadily to reach 1,850 in 2007. Panel a also shows that the 
rise and fall in annual counts until 2003 occurs for both domestic and global IPOs. The surge in overall 
counts after 2003 is much more dramatic for global offers. For domestic IPOs, 2007 does not exceed the 
earlier peaks, while the count for global IPOs in 2007 is higher than any other year in the sample period. 
Generally, there is more variation in global IPOs. From the peak in 2000 to the trough in 2003, global 
IPOs fall by 84%; in contrast, domestic IPOs fall by only 44%. 13 
The results for IPO proceeds are presented in Table 1, Panel b. We obtain proceeds in U.S. dollars 
from SDC and convert them into constant 2007 values using U.S. inflation rates from the World Bank‟s 
WDI database. This panel shows that total annual IPO proceeds rise during the 1990s to reach a peak of 
$240 billion in 2000. Annual proceeds decline to $59 billion by 2003 and then rise again, reaching a peak 
of almost $280 billion in 2007. Domestic IPO proceeds are less volatile over the period, so that changes 
in annual proceeds from global IPOs are the more important factor in the steady rise of total IPO proceeds 
during the 1990s and especially in the rapid expansion after 2003, reaching $189 billion in 2007. Indeed, 
total proceeds raised in global IPOs account for almost 68% of all IPO proceeds in 2007. Global IPOs 
include a domestic tranche and international tranches. The last column of Panel b shows proceeds raised 
in the international tranches of global IPOs. As a percentage of total proceeds raised in global IPOs, 
proceeds raised in international tranches have increased over the 2000s, reaching a peak of 90% in 2007. 
There are some important differences in the evolution of counts and proceeds in both domestic and 
global IPOs. In the 1990s, there is a dramatic increase in counts that is driven by an increase in domestic 
IPOs.  The  number  of  domestic  IPOs  peaks  in  1996  and  does  not  come  close  to  that  peak  again  in 
subsequent years. In fact, after 2000, the count never exceeds even half the peak reached in 1996. In 
contrast, however, domestic IPOs proceeds have elevated values in the mid-1990s, but the proceeds raised 
in 2006 dwarf those of earlier years. There is a steady increase in the number of global IPOs until 2000. 
The count then drops, but increases again after 2003 and peaks in 2007. Proceeds raised in global IPOs 
increase throughout the 1990s to reach a peak in 2000, collapse to a trough in 2003, and then increase 
sharply to reach the peak of 2000 again in 2007, although the percentage of global IPO proceeds raised in 
international tranches is much higher in 2007 compared to 2000. In summary, before the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, global IPOs matched their previous peak of 2000. Domestic IPO counts did not match 
their previous peak of 1996, but domestic IPO proceeds are the highest in our sample in 2006. 
The cross-country pattern in annual IPO counts is exhibited in Table 2, Panel a. Developed countries 
with the largest economies and capital markets in the world, such as the U.S. (6,126 IPOs), Japan (2,234), 
Canada (2,225), U.K. (1,650), Australia (1,558), and Hong Kong (822), have high overall counts, but a 14 
number of emerging countries such as India (4,867), China (1,764), Taiwan (822), and  South Korea 
(779), have high counts as well. Fifteen countries are in the top twenty-five countries both for counts and 
proceeds. Panel b shows that the U.S. total of $648 billion constitutes almost 25% of the total worldwide 
IPO proceeds of $2.55 trillion. The other major markets include China ($254 billion, 10%), Japan ($204 
billion, 9%), U.K. ($196 billion, 8%), and are followed by France (5%), Germany (4%), Canada (3%), 
and Italy (3%). However, some countries that are in the top 25 for counts are not in the top 25 for 
proceeds (Greece, Israel, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Poland), whereas some countries are in the top 25 for 
proceeds but not for counts (Bermuda, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and Switzerland). 
The country-by-country averages hide dramatic changes in the frequency of IPOs across countries. In 
addition to showing the counts for all IPOs across the world, Figure 1 shows the counts for the U.S., the 
U.K., and China (Panel a). The U.S. dominates the U.K. and China in counts until 2001 when the counts 
are roughly the same and stay that way to the end of the sample period. The U.S. counts peaked in 1996, 
but the number of U.S. IPOs has been small compared to that peak since 2001. If at one point the U.S. 
was the “land of the IPO,” it is not in the 2000s if one focuses on IPO counts.  One way to see this is that 
the U.S. share of total IPO counts exceeds 20% in each of the first ten years of the sample except for 1994 
when it is 19%. It never exceeds 13% after 2001. In the 1990s, the U.S. share of total IPO counts towers 
over the share of the U.K. and China, as each country‟s share is below 10% each year in the 1990s. 
Though the shares of these countries increase in the 2000s, the U.S. share stops towering over their 
shares, mostly because the U.S. share is so much lower in the 2000s. Though we do not show this on the 
figure, Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and Korea all experienced substantial increases in counts as well. 
There has also been a dramatic shift in the composition of IPO proceeds over the past two decades. 
The U.S. share of total IPO proceeds has declined from about 30% in the 1990s to only 21% in the 2000s 
(through 2007, at least). Japan and the U.K. have also experienced a decline from 10% to 6% and from 
9% to 6%, respectively. Among the other large markets, no major shift in market share arises (e.g., 
Canada, France, Italy, and Germany), except for China which more than doubles from a 6% to 14% share 15 
($182 billion out of the $1.29 trillion). In 2006 and 2007, China‟s total IPO proceeds actually exceed 
those of the U.S. (see Panel b). 
The decreased importance of U.S. IPOs occurs at different times for counts versus proceeds. The 
share of U.S. counts in world IPO counts decreases sharply until 1994. After that year, it increases until 
1999 and then collapses starting in 2000. It stays steadily low in the 2000s. In contrast, U.S. IPO proceeds 
mostly follow the world‟s proceeds until 2003, when the world IPO proceeds take off and the U.S. IPO 
proceeds do not. One useful way to compare patterns in counts and proceeds for the U.S. and the world is 
to benchmark them relative to the number of listed firms and GDP, respectively. Figure 2 summarizes this 
evidence. It reports the ratio of IPO counts to the number of domestic listed firms (Panel a) and the ratio 
of IPO proceeds to GDP (Panel b) for the both the U.S. and for the world. It also reports the difference 
between  the  U.S.  and  the  World.  The  U.S.  tends  to  have  higher  values  than  the  world,  but  not 
consistently, until 1999. After 2003 the ratios for the world increase while the ratios for the U.S. stagnate. 
If the importance of IPOs in the U.S. relative to the economic importance of the U.S. relative to the world 
were unchanged, we would expect these ratios to stay constant. Instead, we see that the ratios fall over 
time, so that the importance of IPOs in the U.S. relative to the world has not kept up with the economic 
importance of the U.S. 
Figure 3 performs a different benchmark analysis for the U.S. by computing its share of IPO counts 
and proceeds relative to that of the world over time. The statistics are reported separately for all IPOs, 
domestic IPOs only, global IPOs only, and also for the global component of global IPOs for the analysis 
based on proceeds. We observe a steady decline in the U.S. share of IPO counts (Panel a) regardless of 
the type of IPO. For the U.S. share of the world‟s IPO proceeds (Panel b), we see that the decline arises 
primarily from the share of global IPO proceeds from around 10% in the 1990s to a negligible fraction 
after 2001. In fact, the U.S. holds a steady fraction of domestic IPO proceeds around 35% over these two 
decades. 
The evidence in this section shows that IPOs in the rest of the world have become  much more 
important and IPOs in the U.S. have become less important. One possible explanation could be that 16 
foreign countries became more like the U.S., so that their IPO rates have become more similar to U.S. 
IPO rates. With this explanation, the characteristics of the U.S. that made it a country where IPOs were 
much more important than in the rest of the world became adopted by other countries, so that the U.S. is 
no longer unusual. Another explanation, however, is that countries have become less important because 
firms wanting to pursue IPOs have found ways to avoid being hindered by institutional obstacles. For 
instance, firms can use global markets to go public and avoid the constraints of their home country. In the 
next section, we explore the importance of country characteristics as determinants of IPO activity. In 
Section IV, we address the role of global IPOs. 
 
III. Do national institutions and market conditions matter for IPO activity around the world? 
In order to assess the importance of national institutions, like corporate laws, securities laws, their 
enforcement, and measures of political risk, as well as market conditions, such as equity valuations in a 
country, we need to benchmark IPO activity in terms of both counts and proceeds relative to the extent of 
potential  activity.  The  literature  has  employed  different  approaches  to  gauge  this  potential  activity. 
Previous work on IPO activity in a country in terms of counts has been benchmarked relative to the 
population in a given country (LLSV, 1997) and the number of listed companies on the major exchanges 
(DLLS, 2008). We choose to use the latter. IPO activity in terms of the proceeds of equity issued by 
newly listed firms in a country has been benchmarked relative to its GDP by LLS (2006) and DLLS 
(2008) and relative to the total assets of the firms involved in raising capital (Kim and Weisbach, 2008). 
We choose to use the former. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics by year for domestic IPO counts as a fraction of the previous 
year‟s number of domestic listed firms (Panel a) and for domestic IPO proceeds as a fraction of the 
previous year‟s GDP in millions of U.S. dollars (Panel b). Domestic IPO proceeds include proceeds from 
domestic IPOs only. We multiply both ratios by 100 and winsorize them at the 1% and 99% thresholds. 
We restrict the analysis to the subset of countries used in Tables 1 and 2 to those that have sufficient data 17 
on changing market conditions that we include in our regressions below.
6 IPO activity by counts ranges 
from a low of 0.43% of listed firms in 1990 to as high as 5.38% in 1994. These are means across 
countries and it should be noted that there is significant dispersion in activity across countries by year 
and, moreover, that the number of countries with non-zero IPO counts changes over time. Fewer countries 
have no IPOs when IPO markets are hot around the world than when they are cold. Specifically, the 
number of countries that have no IPOs in a year is negatively correlated with the worldwide average of 
IPOs per number of listed firms.
7 This evidence suggests that global market conditions play an important 
role in IPO activity at the country level. We will provide more such evidence in regressions that analyze 
the country-level IPO rate. 
In Panel b, domestic IPO proceeds as a fraction of GDP ranges from as low as 0.08% in 1990 to as 
high as 0.26% in 1994. The time-variation in IPO proceeds across years follows closely the pattern in 
counts per number of listed firms, but not perfectly. This fact implies that there are interesting differences 
in the offering sizes of IPOs across years, part of which stem from the types of firms that go public and 
part of which stem from the countries of domicile that dominate IPO activity in those years. It is useful to 
point out that the range of this fraction is limited by the fact that proceeds (in billions of U.S. dollars) are 
typically small relative to the GDP of a country (also, in billions of U.S. dollars) even if scaled by 100. In 
particular, the maximum fraction of IPO proceeds never exceeds 2% in any year. Again, there is a large 
fraction of countries that are counted in these means by year for which there are no IPO proceeds. 
A.  The role of changing investment opportunities and market conditions. 
Everything else being equal, we would expect to see more IPOs in countries with better growth 
opportunities, with more economic development, and with higher financial development.  We include 
log(GDP / capita), market cap / GDP, and market turnover as measures of the level of economic and 
                                                 
6 An important control variable in our subsequent analysis is country q for which we require that a country have this 
data available for at least one year to qualify for the summary statistics in Table 3. This restriction eliminates 35 
countries (which together constitute only 300 IPOs out of our total sample of 24,122) leaving 54 countries. 
7 We tested whether this relationship is statistically reliable using Tobit regressions of the percentage of countries 
with non-zero counts or proceeds on the mean IPO rate across countries by count or proceeds, respectively. There is 
a statistically significant negative coefficient for the proceeds relationship (coefficient of -1.30, t-statistic of -2.66) 
and a negative, but insignificant, coefficient for the same by counts. 18 
financial market development, and lagged country q as a measure of corporate valuations in the country. 
Further, the world domestic IPO rate is included to control for unobservable global macroeconomic and 
capital market factors that influence IPO activity around the world. Each of these variables is lagged by 
one year. Lagging these variables is especially important for market capitalization and turnover since 
these variables would be directly affected by IPO activity.  We estimate this specification as a panel 
regression using ordinary least squares allowing the standard errors to be clustered by country. 
Table 4 presents the  estimates  for regressions that  project measures of domestic IPO activity on 
domestic economic and financial variables as well as domestic IPO activity outside the country. The first 
specification in Panel a uses domestic IPO counts normalized by the lagged number of listed firms as the 
measure of IPO activity and the first specification in Panel b uses domestic IPO proceeds relative to 
lagged GDP. 
In Panel a for domestic IPO counts, the first important finding is that the world domestic IPO rate is a 
reliably positive and economically important factor. The coefficient of 0.397 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in the world IPO activity rate (2.25%) is associated with a 0.89% increase in the IPO 
activity rate for a given country, or about 20.3% of its standard deviation. This is a sizeable source of 
common variation in IPO activity around the world. We performed several robustness checks to confirm 
the reliability of this result. Another statistically reliable coefficient is that for country q. The economic 
magnitude of that relationship is only slightly smaller than that of the world factor. Its coefficient of 2.618 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in q (0.32%) is associated with a 0.84% increase in IPO 
activity rate, which constitutes 19% of its standard deviation. The coefficients on market cap / GDP and 
market turnover are positive as expected but these coefficients are only significant at the 10% level (the 
coefficients on the world IPO rate and country q are significant at the 1% level). Log(GDP / capita) has a 
negative coefficient but it is not significant. The explanatory power of this specification is 13.3%.
8 
                                                 
8 We performed some residual diagnostics for the base specifications in both panels of Table 4. There is evidence of 
significant  positive  skewness  (coefficient  of  2.15)  in  the  residuals.  In  Panel  a  for  counts,  the  largest  negative 
residuals were around -7.31 whereas the largest positive residuals were around 20.9 given a mean residual of -0.80. 
There is some evidence of excess positive kurtosis (coefficient of 10.44). The extent of potential non-normality in 19 
The  first  column  in  Panel  b  presents  the  results  of  the  same  base  regression  for  domestic  IPO 
proceeds normalized by lagged GDP. The results are similar to those for counts. The world domestic IPO 
rate factor (excluding the country of interest) is reliably positive. Its coefficient of 0.511 implies that a 
one standard deviation increase in the world IPO activity rate is association with an increase of 0.029%, 
which constitutes about 10.4% of its standard deviation.
9 In this specification, the coefficient on  the 
country q is also positive, statistically reliable, and has a larger economic magnitude corresponding to 
about 19% of the standard deviation of the IPO activity rate in proceeds. The coefficient on market 
turnover is positive but is not significant, while that for market cap / GDP is significant at the 1% level. 
The explanatory power of this base specification is 10.8%. 
In  supplementary,  unreported  regressions,  we  estimated  specifications  with  annual  U.S.  dollar-
denominated national index returns in excess of the Datastream World Index instead of country q. The 
coefficient was reliably positive yielding similar explanatory power. We also  estimated specifications 
with and without log(GDP / capita) without much consequence. Further, we found that expanding the 
panel to include countries with no IPO activity during the 18-year horizon leads to similar conclusions. 
The next question we pursue is whether measures of the quality of national institutions can explain how 
domestic IPO activity differs across countries beyond these factors that relate to market conditions and 
the level of capital market and economic development. 
B.  National laws and governance institutions and domestic IPO activity. 
In both panels of Table 4, the remaining specifications for the panel regressions of domestic IPO 
activity  include  one  of a variety  of  country-level  measures  of  laws  and  governance institutions.  We 
include  these  variables  one  at  a  time,  but  have  also  estimated  in  unreported  specifications  various 
                                                                                                                                                             
Panel b for proceeds is similar with excess positive skewness (coefficient of 2.73) and kurtosis (coefficient of 
12.71), but the ranges of extreme values for the residuals are much smaller. Later, we report on supplementary tests 
dealing with concerns about censored samples using Tobit regression analysis. 
9 We conducted a principal components analysis (PCA) of the first several principal components of IPO activity 
rates (for IPO proceeds as a fraction of GDP). The proportion of total variation across countries and years explained 
by the first PC was 9.61%, which is very close to the economic magnitudes we uncovered above. The second PC 
explained another 6.65%, the third PC, another 5.03% and the first five PCs together cumulatively explained 31.8%. 
These proportions were stable across different subperiods. 20 
combinations of them. We should also state from the outset that our analysis below for domestic IPO 
proceeds  as  a  fraction  of  GDP  is  robust  to  including  domestic  proceeds  from  global  IPOs  in  the 
numerator. 
In general, we find that the better is the quality of the national institutions in a country, the higher is 
the level of domestic IPO activity. In the second column of each panel, the addition of the common law 
dummy variable adds explanatory power to the base model, especially for the analysis of proceeds in 
Panel b (the adjusted R
2 increases from 10.8% to 14.4%). The coefficient is weakly positive with a value 
of 1.59% for domestic IPO counts as a fraction of the number of listed firms and reliably positive with a 
value of 0.11% for domestic IPO proceeds as a fraction of GDP. LLSV (1997) find similar results using 
counts of IPOs per millions in population for a two-year period, 1995-1996. In contrast to their approach, 
we use a panel regression and account for country and world market conditions. The positive coefficient 
on anti-director rights is insignificant for both the IPO count and proceeds regressions and the adjusted R
2 
actually declines with its inclusion. In LLSV (1997, Table VI), the coefficient on the original anti-director 
rights index is reliably positive for their IPO counts regressions, but in LLS (2006, Table III), it is 
similarly insignificant when they measure IPO proceeds relative to GDP (for 1996 to 2000), like we do in 
Panel b. The anti-self-dealing index from DLLS (2008) is positive and reliably significant in both panels. 
For IPO counts, the coefficient of 5.69 implies that a one standard deviation higher score in anti-self-
dealing (say, from that of Switzerland to Canada) is associated with an increase of 1.31%, or 31% of its 
standard deviation. The economic magnitude of this variable is similar for IPO proceeds. The adjusted R
2 
increases substantially to 20.9% (from 13.3% in the base specification) in Panel a and to 18.9% (from 
10.8%) in Panel b.
10 
The next regressions include the securities laws measures developed in LLS (2006). We include the 
indexes for disclosure, burden of proof, public enforcement, and investor protection. LLS (2006) show 
these variables separately and together to be statistically and economically important for explaining IPO 
                                                 
10 In Table 6 of DLLS (2008), the anti-self-dealing variable has a reliably positive coefficient of 4.14 for their 
specification on IPO proceeds relative to GDP though with fewer control variables for the level of economic and 
financial development. They discuss the large economic significance of this variable (p. 449). 21 
activity measured by proceeds for the high IPO activity period of 1996-2000 (their Tables III and V). We 
similarly find that the coefficients on these variables are important for both IPO counts and proceeds. For 
example, disclosure has a coefficient of 7.334 (robust t-statistic of 4.89) in Panel a for IPO counts; this 
implies that a one standard deviation higher score (say, from that of Turkey to Spain) is associated with a 
1.54% higher rate of IPOs to the number of listed companies, which represents about 35% of its standard 
deviation.  The  adjusted  R
2  for  this  specification  in  Panel  a  is  22.8%  (from  13.3%  in  the  base 
specification). The results for the public enforcement, burden of proof, and investor protection indexes are 
similarly  reliable  statistically  and  large  economically.  That  the  results  for  the  disclosure  index  are 
particularly strong is important support for the key prediction in Stulz (2009) where credible disclosure 
commitment ex ante and ex post by means of strong securities laws is critical for the entrepreneur to 
maximize offering proceeds. 
We obtain similar, but distinctly weaker, results for several of the other national institutions proxy 
variables we consider. Stulz (2005) argues that an entrepreneur has  an incentive to not go public in 
countries were the state is predatory since it is easier for the state to prey on public companies as more 
information is available about them. We find no evidence to support this prediction in terms of IPO 
counts or proceeds. We also examine a measure of the  rule of law. There is evidence of a positive 
relationship,  but  it  is  more  reliable for  IPO  counts (coefficient  of  1.22  with  t-statistic  of  2.60)  than 
proceeds (only weakly significant) and, even then, the economic magnitude of the relationship is smaller 
than the LLS (2006) securities laws variables. Finally, we evaluate a measure of ownership concentration 
that a number of the theoretical models we work from associate with stronger laws and governance 
institutions.  SW  (2002)  predict  lower  concentration  of  ownership  in  countries  with  better  investor 
protections and Stulz (2005) associates this outcome with a less predatory government. In LLSV (1998), 
LLS (2006), and DLLS (2008), lower ownership concentration (computed as the stake of the top three 
shareholders in the largest 10 firms in a country) is associated with common law origins and higher scores 
on the anti-director rights, anti-self dealing, disclosure, burden of proof, and public enforcement indexes. 
We find that ownership is reliably negatively related to domestic IPO activity by counts and by proceeds. 22 
There are several potential concerns with the regressions of Table 4. First, institutions could change 
because of a demand for IPOs, so that the quality of institutions in a country could be endogenous to IPO 
activity that takes place there. This concern is not plausible with the common law dummy. Yet, we find 
evidence of an association of common law with IPO frequency. The concern is possibly more acute with 
some of the other national institutions variables, such as the anti-self dealing index. In tests not reported 
in  a  table,  we  estimated  instrumental  variables  regression  models  in  which  the  national  institutions 
variables were instrumented with the common law indicator variable.
11 The resulting regressions lead to 
similar conclusions as the regressions that we report. Second, institutions affect financial and economic 
development. Consequently, we might be understating the influence of institutions. We estimated our 
regressions  without  the  financial  and  economic  development  variables.  The  results  are  unchanged. 
Finally, one might be concerned that the dependent variable is censored at zero. We re-estimated our 
regressions using a Tobit regression model. The results in these regressions are often stronger than those 
reported in the table. 
We saw in Section II that the landscape of IPO activity changes dramatically during our sample 
period. In particular, the relative importance of U.S. IPOs and non-U.S. IPOs switched. The changes we 
discussed in Section II raise the question of whether the relation between IPO activity and institutions is 
stable through time and holds up with the rapid globalization of financial markets and with the rise of IPO 
activity all around the world. As explained in the introduction, there are good reasons to believe that 
globalization decreases the importance of national institutions. 
C.  Comparing domestic IPO activity during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Table 5 presents panel regression results that are similar to those of Table 4, except that we introduce 
a dummy variable that allows for a shift in the level of domestic IPO activity for the post-2000 period. 
This dummy variable is also allowed to interact with the national institutions variables. In Panel a, we 
                                                 
11 DLLS (2008) use legal origins as an instrument for legal rules in a similar two-stage estimation procedure where 
the second stage explained financial development, such as IPO activity. In a survey by LLS (2008, pp. 293-294), the 
authors argue that such two-stage procedures are not recommended, however, since legal origins influence a broad 
range of rules and regulations and researchers cannot guarantee that the relevant ones are not omitted in the first 
stage. That is, legal rules can influence financial market outcomes other than through rules protecting investors. 23 
present the results for IPO counts as a fraction of the domestic number of listings and, in Panel b, for IPO 
proceeds  as  a  fraction  of GDP.  We  also investigated,  but  do  not  report,  specifications  in  which  we 
estimate  the  panel  specifications  separately  for  the  two  decades,  an  approach  which  allows  the 
coefficients  of  the  base  variables  in  the  model,  such  as  country  q,  market  turnover,  and  the  world 
domestic IPO rate, to shift. Although there is some evidence of changes in the coefficients of the base 
variables between the 1990s and the 2000s, our results about the change in the importance of institutions 
hold equally well for both approaches.
12 
In the first specification, the coefficient on the Post-2000 dummy variable is reliably negative for 
domestic IPO counts (Panel a) and proceeds (Panel b). This is not surprising given the trends uncovered 
in Table 3, where the peak rates of domestic IPO activity were revealed in the 1992-1994 period. When 
we allow the Post-2000 dummy variable to interact with the national institutions variables, we confirm 
that  this  observation  holds  true:  the  negative  coefficient  on  the  Post-2000  dummy  variable  itself 
disappears (sometimes becomes positive), the positive coefficients on the national institutions variables 
remain so for the 1990s, but are negative and reliably so, when interacting with the Post-2000 dummy. In 
other  words,  the  strong  positive  association  we  uncovered  between  domestic  IPO  activity  rates  and 
national institutions proxy variables earlier arises from the relationship in the 1990s. It is weaker both 
statistically and economically in the 2000s. 
This weakening of the relationships in the 2000s arises for just about every national institutions proxy 
variable that we study. In the specifications for the common law dummy variable, the reliably positive 
coefficient implies a 2.48% higher rate of IPO counts per listed firm, but it is juxtaposed with a similarly 
significant, negative coefficient for the Post-2000 interaction variable, which implies a much smaller 
0.49% higher rate for the 2000s. Not surprisingly, if we estimate a regression for the 2000s only, the 
common  law  dummy  is  not  significant.  A  similar  shift  obtains  for  IPO  proceeds  in  the  equivalent 
                                                 
12 In the base model of Table 5, Panel a, for example, the coefficient on country q remains positive though it is 
smaller in  magnitude and loses its statistical significance. The coefficient on  market  cap / GDP is statistically 
significant in both periods, though smaller in magnitude in the 2000s, whereas that on market turnover is virtually 
unchanged. 24 
specification in Panel b. An important implication of this finding is that the economic magnitudes of these 
relationships in the 1990s were even stronger than we realized in the previous section. Consider the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for the anti-self-dealing index from DLLS (2008) that 
arise for the domestic IPO counts and proceeds regressions in both panels. In Panel a of Table 5, the 
coefficient for IPO counts of 6.566 (previously 5.694) implies that a one standard deviation higher score 
in the anti-self-dealing variable is associated with an increase of 1.58%, or 50% of its standard deviation, 
in the 1990s. The equivalent coefficient for the 2000s of 4.399 (6.656 less 2.257) implies an increase of 
only 1.04%, or 20% of its standard deviation. 
Similar changes in the relationship across the 1990s and 2000s arise for the disclosure, burden of 
proof, public enforcement, and investor protection indexes from LLS (2006). Our findings are distinctly 
weaker for the anti-director rights and political risk variables, neither of which was reliably significant in 
the full sample regressions in Table 4. The ownership variable had a negative coefficient in Table 4 since 
it is negatively related to the strength of institutions; consequently, we would expect a positive coefficient 
on the interaction if the relation between ownership concentration and IPO activity weakened during the 
2000s. We find no evidence in support of that prediction in Table 5a and only weak evidence in Table 5b. 
The adjusted R
2‟s in the specifications with the Post-2000 dummy variable and the interactions are 
typically higher, which suggests that capturing these changes in the role of institutions is important. At 
the same time, however, if we estimate regressions separately for the 1990s and 2000s, we find (not 
tabulated) that the regressions have more explanatory power in the 1990s than in the 2000s. Part of the 
story is that the unconditional variation in domestic IPO activity rates is considerably higher in the 2000s. 
The standard deviation of domestic IPO counts across countries and years rises from 3.03% to 5.19%. 
It is interesting to note that the countries that were most important for IPO activity in the 1990s lost 
importance in the 2000s. The countries that were predominant in the 1990s, such as the U.K., U.S., 
Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong, ceded substantial IPO share to a number of new countries with 
sizeable IPO activity in the 2000s, but with typically poorer institutions. This change in relative IPO 
activity  across  countries  is  consistent  with  a  decrease  in  the  importance  of  institutions  since,  had 25 
institutions remained as important, regressions using the 1990s data would predict that the countries that 
gained prominence in IPO activity in the 2000s would not have done so. 
Each of the theories we outlined in the introduction predicts a weakening role for national institutions 
for domestic IPO activity that we observe. Recall from SW (2002) that firms are larger, more valuable, 
and greater in number with higher dividends and less diversion of profits if legal protections are better. 
An important corollary of their model, however, is that more open capital markets are associated with 
greater  IPO  activity  in  a  given  country  and  that  any  differences  in  investor  protection  laws  across 
countries will diminish in importance. More open markets enable firms to take advantage of financial 
development, the economic development, and the institutions of foreign countries (see, among others, 
Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007; and Stulz, 2009). In the next section we 
provide  further  evidence  in  support  of  these  theories.  We  uncover  a  negative  empirical  association 
between the rates of global IPO activity around the world and the national institutions proxy variables. 
That is, countries with weaker institutions have higher rates of global IPO activity. 
 
IV. The consequences of financial globalization for global IPO activity around the world. 
Our  evidence  in  Section  II  shows  that  IPOs  in  the  rest  of  the  world  have  become  much  more 
important and IPOs in the U.S. have become much less important. We have further revealed in Section III 
that a country‟s national institutions, whether corporate laws, securities laws, disclosure rules, or their 
enforcement in general, have become a less important factor for the extent of domestic IPO activity. One 
possible explanation is that countries‟ national institutions have become less important because firms 
wanting  to  pursue  IPOs  have  found  ever  increasingly  more  ways  made  available  by  financial 
globalization to avoid being hindered by institutional obstacles. These firms have gained greater and more 
advantageous access to global markets for their shares irrespective of the institutions of their country of 
domicile. For instance, firms can use global markets to go public to avoid being constrained by their 
home country. Indeed, firms in many countries are pursuing IPOs in foreign markets or, at least, they are 26 
including foreign tranches in global IPOs. Is this pursuit related to the quality of national institutions? Is 
there evidence that this relationship is changing over time? 
A.  Understanding global IPO activity. 
In Table 6, we report the results of panel regressions that are similar to those of Table 5, except that 
our variable of interest is not domestic IPO counts and proceeds, but global IPO counts and proceeds. 
Global counts include foreign IPOs as well as global IPOs with a domestic and international tranche. 
Unlike our earlier analysis, these counts are deflated by the total number of IPOs, including both domestic 
and global IPOs, so we are evaluating how intensively the firms in a country pursue global opportunities. 
Global IPO proceeds include the U.S. dollar proceeds of the foreign IPOs as well as those from the 
international tranches of global IPOs (the proceeds assigned to the domestic tranche are excluded). Global 
IPO proceeds are deflated by total IPO proceeds, including domestic and global, so again we study the 
intensity of the pursuit of capital raising activity outside the home country. If firms from a given country 
do not have any IPOs in a given year, the global IPO variables are set to missing. 
We include in the base specifications several additional factors to account for the changing global 
economic and capital market environment. As before, it is important to control for the level of worldwide 
global IPO activity in order to  isolate the factors that influence the unique country-level global IPO 
activity. However, we also want to control for the level of domestic IPO activity in the country in order to 
capture the extent to which the pursuit of global IPOs is a substitute or a complement activity. Slower 
domestic IPO activity may be associated with an increase in the intensity of global IPO activity because 
of the constraints imposed on emerging firms by the existence of weak national institutions at home or 
simply better capital-raising opportunities elsewhere. But relatively underdeveloped capital markets at 
home may just as easily impose capacity constraints on the demands of capital-hungry firms such that 
high  domestic  IPO  and  global  IPO  activity  arise  together.  We  compute  the  world  global  IPO  rate 
measured in terms of global IPO counts per listed firms or of global IPO proceeds per GDP. The world 
domestic IPO rate is also included as is the actual domestic IPO activity rate in the country of interest 27 
(i.e., the dependent variable in Table 4). To avoid possibly spurious findings, these variables are lagged 
by one year, as are all other control variables. 
To capture the influence of differences in local country-specific growth opportunities and global 
growth opportunities, we include  country q and global q in our regressions. These variables will be 
correlated, but we will interpret the coefficient on the global q ratio as a measure of growth opportunities 
that is independent of a country‟s institutions.
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In the regressions exhibited in the first columns of Panel a for global IPO counts and of Panel b for 
global  IPO  proceeds,  we  find  that  the  coefficient  on  the  global  IPO  factor  is  reliably  positive  and 
economically large.  This is  what we would expect to observe if there are important macroeconomic 
cyclical factors as well as common long-term secular forces of deregulation and liberalization of capital 
markets that influence global IPO activity across all markets. In Panel a, the coefficient of 13.461 implies 
that  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  global  IPO  activity  worldwide  is  associated  with  a  5.47% 
increase in global IPO counts in a country, which represents 14% of the standard deviation of global IPO 
activity.  The  equivalent  coefficient  for  global  IPO  proceeds  in  Panel  b  is  also  significant  and 
economically large. We also find reliable evidence that the level of domestic IPO activity is negatively 
related to the fraction of IPO counts and proceeds that are global. The economic importance of this 
relationship is even larger. For counts in Panel a, the coefficient on the domestic IPO rate is -3.311 which 
implies that a one standard deviation increase in domestic IPO counts per listed companies is associated 
with  a  14.6%  decrease  in  the  fraction  of  IPOs  that  are  global,  which is  about  38%  of  the  standard 
deviation of global IPO activity. The economic importance of the negative influence of domestic IPO 
activity by proceeds is much smaller. We also find that market turnover is negatively related to the 
intensity of global IPO activity by counts and proceeds. Both of these are reliable indicators that robust 
                                                 
13 This is similar in spirit to the GEGO measure in Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007) which is defined as 
the difference between the country‟s growth opportunities (GGO, measured with value-weighted global industry P/E 
ratios using local country value weightings) and world growth opportunities (WGO, as before but with global value 
weightings). We do not difference our measures, but leave them to be estimated separately. In some robustness tests, 
we obtained Bekaert et al.‟s actual GEGO measures directly through 2005 and confirmed (at least for our global 
proceeds regressions) the robustness of our main findings on national institutions to this alternative measure. We 
thank Stefan Siegel, in particular, for preparing and sharing their data. 28 
domestic IPO activity is associated with fewer and less global IPO activity, not more. None of the other 
variables  add  explanatory  power,  though  the  positive  coefficient  on  log(GDP  /  capita)  is  marginally 
significant as is that for global q in global IPO proceeds. The overall explanatory power of the base 
specification is reasonably good for the global IPO proceeds (adjusted R
2 of 13%), and even better for 
global IPO counts (adjusted R
2 of almost 24%). 
B.  The importance of national institutions for global IPO activity. 
To  the  first  regressions  of  both  panels,  we  add  one  national  institutions  proxy  variable  in  each 
subsequent column in both panels. We want to determine whether legal protections for minority investors, 
securities laws, disclosure rules, and their enforcement in a country influence the intensity with which 
firms pursue global IPOs, even after controlling for the overall level of domestic and global IPO activity, 
growth opportunities, and market conditions. We find a reliable and important negative relationship for 
many of these variables. For example, countries with better anti-director rights are associated with much 
less global IPO activity. The negative coefficient on anti-director of -7.677 in Panel a implies an 8.43% 
lower  fraction  of  global  IPO  counts,  which  accounts  for  about  22%  of  its  standard  deviation.  The 
relationship is negative but weaker in Panel b for global IPO proceeds. We obtain a similarly reliable 
negative relationship for the intensity of global IPO counts using the common law dummy as well as the 
anti-self-dealing, disclosure, and investor protection indexes. We expect a positive relationship between 
ownership and the extent of global IPO activity, and we confirm this in the last column of Panel a. As 
noted in the domestic IPO count regressions in Table 4, the rule of law and political risk variables are not 
reliable, though they usually have the right sign. While the public enforcement and burden of proof 
indexes have a strong positive coefficient in Table 4, they do not have a significant impact on global 
IPOs. Though most of the institutions proxies that had a significant impact on domestic IPO activity in 
Table 4 have a negative significant impact on global IPO activity in Table 6, there are some exceptions. 
For instance, the anti-director index is significant in Table 6 but not Table 4; the opposite is the case for 
burden of proof and public enforcement. 29 
The statistical and economic significance of the national institutions proxy variables are often weaker 
in regressions for the intensity of global IPO activity by proceeds in Panel b of Table 6 than in the count 
regressions in Panel a, but the results in both panels are mostly consistent. Again, while the institution 
variables generally have significant positive coefficients for domestic IPO proceeds, they have significant 
negative or insignificant coefficients for the global IPO proceeds regressions. As we saw in Panel a for 
the global IPO count results, the most reliable national institutions variables are disclosure and investor 
protection. They have both reliably negative coefficients. The coefficient of -42.507 on disclosure implies 
a one standard deviation higher score (say, from that of Turkey to Sweden) is associated with a 8.91% 
decline in the fraction of IPO proceeds that are global offerings, which represents about 26% of its 
standard deviation. The rule of law is negatively related to the global fraction of IPO proceeds and 
ownership is positively related, as expected. The common law dummy, the anti-director rights index, and 
the anti-self-dealing index have negative coefficients, but are significant only at the 10% level. 
We  saw  in  the  previous  section  that  national  institutions  became  less  important  determinants  of 
domestic IPO activity in the second half of our sample. We now explore whether the same result holds for 
global IPOs. 
C.  Comparing global IPO activity during the 1990s and 2000s. 
If institutions have become less important for the level of domestic IPO activity and if financial 
globalization and the accessibility of global IPOs are related to this development, then we would expect 
that national institutions have become similarly less important for the intensity of global IPO activity 
during the most recent decade. Panels a and b in Table 7 represent the equivalent tests to those in Table 5, 
but for the fraction of total IPOs that arise in global form by count and by proceeds, respectively. We 
employ the same base specification for our panel regressions as in the previous section, but we introduce 
a dummy variable for the Post-2000 period and allow this variable to interact with the proxy variable for 
the quality of national institutions in each additional specification. 
In the first specification in Panel a, the Post-2000 dummy variable is not significant, which implies 
that there is no important shift across sub-periods in the overall fraction of IPO counts that are global. We 30 
find the same result for the first specification in Panel b for the fraction of IPO proceeds that are global. 
When we introduce our various national institutions variables, we uncover the expected negative relation 
that we found in Table 6. The higher is the quality of a country‟s institutions, the lower the fraction of 
IPO  counts  that are  global. The interactions of the institutions  variables  with  the  Post-2000  dummy 
variable are significant and of the predicted sign, but for only three variables: anti-director, anti-self-
dealing,  and  ownership.  In  other  words,  the  importance  of  the  quality  of  a  country‟s  institutions  is 
weakened for some institutions variables, but clearly not for the majority of them. When the effect of an 
institution is weakened, the change is economically significant. Consider, for example, the statistically 
significant and negative coefficient on  the anti-director index of -10.628. This coefficient implies an 
11.66%  lower  fraction  of  global  IPO  counts  in  the  1990s,  which  accounts  for  30%  of  its  standard 
deviation. But the positive, significant coefficient of 6.188 on the interaction variable with the Post-2000 
dummy implies only a 4.87% lower fraction of global IPO counts, a relationship that is only one-third as 
large economically. Such reversal effects in the 2000s are similarly noteworthy for the anti-self-dealing 
index and, to a similar extent, for the ownership variable. 
The  results  for  proceeds  in  Panel  b  are  similar  to  those  of  Panel  a,  except  that  in  Panel  b  the 
importance of common law decreases in the 2000s instead of the importance of the anti-director index, 
which does not. For countries with common law origins, our analysis indicates that there is a 16.31% 
lower  fraction  of  total  IPO  proceeds  raised  globally.  In  the  2000s,  the  positive  coefficient  on  the 
interaction of the common law dummy with the Post-2000 dummy implies that global proceeds fall to 
only a 6.2% lower fraction of total IPO proceeds. 
What is the bottom-line of our findings on global IPOs? As we would expect, global IPOs are a way 
for firms to exploit the better institutions of foreign countries to have a successful or more profitable IPO. 
The  advantage  of  the  institutions  of  foreign  countries  is  inversely  related  to  the  quality  of  a  firm‟s 
domestic institutions, so that it is not surprising that domestic institutions play an opposite role for global 
and domestic IPOs. However, while we find evidence for both domestic and global IPOs that domestic 
institutions become less important in the 2000s than in the 1990s, this evidence is substantially stronger 31 
for domestic IPOs than it is for global IPOs. A plausible explanation for this finding is that financial 
globalization increasingly enables firms whose value is most closely tied to the quality of institutions to 
use global IPOs and to take advantage of the institutions of foreign countries. As a result, firms that use 
domestic IPOs are firms for which the quality of institutions is relatively less important. 
 
V. Conclusions. 
This paper documents dramatic changes in the IPO landscape around the world. U.S. IPOs and IPOs 
from  other  common  law  countries  have  become  less  important,  whether  one  looks  at  counts  or  at 
proceeds. In fact, U.S. IPO activity has generally not kept pace with the economic importance of the U.S. 
Global IPOs have played a critical role in increasing the importance of IPOs  by non-U.S. firms. 
Though firms in countries with weaker institutions are less likely to go public with a domestic IPO, they 
are  more  likely  to  go  public  in  a  global  IPO.  That  is,  global  IPOs  enable  firms  to  overcome  poor 
institutions in their country of origin. Perhaps as a result, the laws and institutions of a firm‟s country of 
origin have become significantly less important in affecting the rate and pace of IPO activity in a country. 
There are important global drivers in domestic IPO activity. Higher levels of worldwide IPO activity 
outside a country are strongly and positively related to the level of IPO activity in that country. However, 
IPO activity is also related to domestic market conditions. Firms are more likely to choose to go public at 
home when valuations are higher in the home market. 
Our paper leaves open some important issues. First, although we find clear evidence that institutions 
have become less important in affecting a country‟s IPO activity, it could be that laws and regulations that 
we do not account for affect IPO activity. Further work should therefore examine the impact of changes in 
laws that are not captured by our institutional proxy variables. Second, we do not investigate the impact 
of financial globalization on individual IPOs. An investigation of the extent to which firms going public 
in financially open countries make use of institutions and resources from other countries would help in 
understanding better the impact of financial globalization on IPO activity. Finally, our focus is resolutely 
on cross-country variation in IPO activity, but as a result we highlight the decreasing role of IPOs in the 32 
U.S. in the 2000s. Further work should address that decrease and explain it. Much recent research and 
policy  debates  have  focused  on  competition  between  London  and  New  York.  We  showed  in earlier 
research (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2009) that New York was not losing market share to London in 
attracting secondary listings of foreign firms. The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 has made this issue 
largely obsolete. However, this paper shows that focusing on the regulatory advantages of London versus 
New York misses the big picture. To abuse once more Thomas Friedman‟s wonderful analogy, the IPO 
world is clearly becoming flat.
14 
   
                                                 
14 See Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. 33 
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Table 1. The IPO sample: 1990 to 2007. 
The initial sample includes 38,724 observations from 1990 to 2007 that SDC identifies as an IPO. IPOs 
with a single domestic tranche flagged as a private placement, global offers with tranches that have issue 
dates 30 or more days apart, transactions that do not contain any information on proceeds raised or SIC 
codes, and IPOs by REITs and investment funds are excluded. IPOs where the country of origin has no 
data and IPOs from countries where there were no domestic IPOs (only global IPOs) during the sample 
period are also excluded. SDC records data for some IPOs over multiple lines. These observations are 
consolidated into one line. The final sample includes 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries. Of these, 24,122 are 
domestic IPOs and 5,239 are global IPOs (IPOs in which some or all of the shares are sold outside the 
home country of the firm going public). Panel a shows IPO counts and Panel b shows IPOs proceeds. 
Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds raised in the domestic tranche of global IPOs. For global 
IPOs,  the  panel  reports  total  proceeds  raised  in  global  IPOs  (proceeds  raised  in  the  domestic  and 
international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the international 
tranches only). Proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (billions). 
  Panel a. IPO counts. 
Year  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs 
       
1990  303  248  55 
1991  891  804  87 
1992  1,339  1,211  128 
1993  2,078  1,860  218 
1994  2,739  2,474  265 
1995  2,688  2,433  255 
1996  3,100  2,766  334 
1997  1,959  1,580  379 
1998  1,232  922  310 
1999  1,589  1,006  583 
2000  2,117  1,452  665 
2001  971  798  173 
2002  914  809  105 
2003  910  809  101 
2004  1,529  1,297  232 
2005  1,473  1,223  250 
2006  1,679  1,314  365 
2007  1,850  1,116  734 
       
Total  29,361  24,122  5,239 
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Table 1, continued. 
  Panel b. IPO proceeds. 




         
1990  $29.6  $18.5  $11.1  $8.8 
1991  $71.7  $37.9  $33.8  $20.5 
1992  $60.8  $35.5  $25.3  $10.6 
1993  $150.2  $92.1  $58.2  $28.8 
1994  $157.7  $77.7  $80.0  $43.2 
1995  $116.4  $47.1  $69.3  $37.3 
1996  $168.8  $81.7  $87.1  $45.2 
1997  $179.8  $69.8  $110.0  $49.2 
1998  $138.2  $32.6  $105.6  $39.8 
1999  $210.0  $59.3  $150.7  $63.2 
2000  $242.2  $51.8  $190.4  $94.0 
2001  $108.1  $35.7  $72.4  $32.1 
2002  $76.5  $46.7  $29.7  $13.4 
2003  $59.1  $34.8  $24.3  $15.2 
2004  $133.8  $62.2  $71.6  $45.1 
2005  $149.4  $82.6  $66.8  $52.4 
2006  $223.7  $121.6  $102.1  $89.8 
2007  $278.6  $89.9  $188.7  $169.4 
         
Total  $2,554.6  $1,077.5  $1,477.1  $858.1 
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Table 2. IPO activity for the top 25 countries around the world: 1990 to 2007. 
IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries over the period from 1990 to 2007. 
Panel a lists the top 25 countries based on total IPO counts. Panel b lists the top 25 countries based on 
total IPO proceeds. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds raised in the domestic tranche of 
global IPOs. For global IPOs the panel reports total proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the 
domestic and international tranches) and global proceeds raised in global IPOs (proceeds raised in the 
international tranches only). Proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars (billions). 
  Panel a. IPO counts. 
Country  All IPOs  Domestic IPOs  Global IPOs 
       
United States  6,126  4,931  1,195 
India  4,867  4,777  90 
Japan  2,234  2,130  104 
Canada  2,225  2,020  205 
China  1,764  1,300  464 
United Kingdom  1,650  1,356  294 
Australia  1,558  1,400  158 
Hong Kong  822  541  281 
Taiwan  822  808  14 
South Korea  779  752  27 
France  750  503  247 
Malaysia  722  697  25 
Germany  573  288  285 
Singapore  488  404  84 
Thailand  408  333  75 
Indonesia  273  189  84 
Pakistan  249  247  2 
Italy  244  54  190 
Greece  185  148  37 
Norway  179  123  56 
Poland  175  133  42 
Israel  155  13  142 
Sweden  143  53  90 
Brazil  128  60  68 
Netherlands  120  26  94 
       
Total: top 25  27,639  23,286  4,353 
       
Rest of world  1722  836  886 
       
Total: all countries  29,361  24,122  5,239 
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Table 2, continued. 
  Panel b. IPO proceeds. 




         
United States  $647.7  $352.3  $295.4  $61.6 
China  $254.6  $110.1  $144.5  $133.1 
Japan  $204.1  $135.2  $68.9  $22.1 
United Kingdom  $196.3  $77.1  $119.2  $68.9 
France  $122.3  $9.7  $112.6  $54.3 
Germany  $106.6  $27.6  $79.0  $45.0 
Italy  $84.2  $9.7  $74.5  $32.4 
Australia  $76.3  $34.4  $41.9  $18.8 
Canada  $68.6  $47.7  $20.9  $15.2 
Hong Kong  $63.6  $12.9  $50.7  $43.6 
South Korea  $58.2  $46.1  $12.1  $10.5 
Russian Fed  $43.6  $13.9  $29.7  $29.7 
Spain  $41.5  $3.2  $38.3  $18.4 
Netherlands  $39.6  $4.1  $35.5  $28.2 
Brazil  $39.3  $14.9  $24.4  $23.3 
Switzerland  $37.1  $9.6  $27.5  $20.2 
Sweden  $33.9  $3.4  $30.5  $17.3 
India  $32.2  $17.8  $14.4  $12.5 
Taiwan  $27.1  $25.5  $1.6  $1.5 
Bermuda  $26.5  $0.1  $26.4  $26.4 
Thailand  $22.9  $11.0  $11.9  $6.5 
Singapore  $20.3  $7.9  $12.4  $10.5 
Indonesia  $20.3  $5.0  $15.3  $9.9 
Mexico  $19.6  $7.0  $12.5  $10.2 
Norway  $18.6  $6.7  $11.9  $8.6 
         
Total: top 25  $2,305.1  $992.8  $1312.3  $728.7 
         
Rest of world  $249.5  $84.7  $164.8  $129.4 
         
Total: all countries  $2,554.6  $1,077.5  $1,477.1  $858.1 
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Table 3. Domestic IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,907 domestic IPOs from 54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year 
during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, domestic IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows annual 
summary statistics for domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows annual summary statistics for domestic 
IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. Both measures are multiplied by 100. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic 
tranche of global IPOs. Both measures of domestic IPO activity are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the 
number of domestic firms or GDP are excluded. 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. 
                                     
Mean  0.429  2.835  4.017  4.463  5.385  2.798  3.346  3.262  1.868  2.324  2.894  1.625  1.559  1.477  2.092  2.125  2.263  2.183 
Median  0.000  0.000  0.784  0.905  1.858  1.075  0.976  0.770  0.566  0.363  0.847  0.000  0.295  0.000  0.405  1.090  1.376  1.207 
Std deviation  0.938  5.250  6.244  6.583  6.871  4.658  5.406  5.274  3.017  3.472  4.197  2.583  2.424  2.667  3.285  2.897  2.448  3.315 
Minimum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  3.704  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  25.234  12.827  15.164  16.620  10.923  10.103  14.734  13.752  13.855  10.043  19.476 
# of countries 
with zero IPOs 
41  33  25  21  19  23  23  17  21  24  19  29  25  28  19  16  13  13 
                                   
                                     
  Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. 
                                     
Mean  0.077  0.148  0.161  0.226  0.261  0.126  0.145  0.156  0.072  0.171  0.121  0.066  0.072  0.075  0.084  0.179  0.195  0.192 
Median  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.058  0.018  0.011  0.009  0.017  0.007  0.016  0.024  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.003  0.111  0.135  0.059 
Std deviation  0.272  0.277  0.309  0.390  0.379  0.217  0.257  0.301  0.136  0.387  0.239  0.196  0.136  0.159  0.137  0.214  0.258  0.365 
Minimum  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Maximum  1.521  1.186  1.486  1.521  1.363  1.050  1.149  1.239  0.626  1.521  1.330  1.332  0.670  0.640  0.517  0.834  1.521  1.521 
# of countries 
with zero IPOs 
39  30  25  20  19  23  23  17  21  24  19  29  25  28  19  16  13  13 
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Table 4. Determinants of domestic IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
The dependent variable is each country‟s annual measure of domestic IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,907 domestic IPOs from 
54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, 
domestic IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual 
domestic IPO count scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s 
annual domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of global IPOs. 
Both measures of domestic IPO activity are multiplied by 100 and are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the 
number of domestic firms or GDP are excluded. In Panel a (Panel b), the world domestic IPO rate is based on counts (proceeds). With the 
exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. 














law  Ownership 
                       





**  -1.291  4.965  3.479 
  (-0.37)  (-0.83)  (-0.50)  (-1.95)  (-3.28)  (-1.90)  (-2.80)  (-2.55)  (-0.60)  (1.42)  (1.28) 
Institutions variable    1.592





***  0.065  1.220
**  -7.598
*** 
    (1.87)  (0.51)  (4.21)  (4.89)  (2.04)  (2.33)  (3.10)  (1.37)  (2.60)  (-3.02) 












  (4.62)  (4.26)  (4.16)  (4.24)  (3.44)  (4.06)  (4.12)  (3.88)  (4.57)  (4.29)  (3.69) 












  (3.02)  (3.21)  (3.20)  (3.13)  (2.66)  (2.67)  (2.54)  (2.66)  (2.99)  (2.82)  (2.59) 
Market cap / GDP  0.971
*  0.441  0.817  -0.080  -0.261  0.712  0.632  0.365  0.900
*  0.870
*  0.944 
  (1.84)  (0.86)  (1.50)  (-0.17)  (-0.54)  (1.29)  (1.28)  (0.70)  (1.68)  (1.70)  (1.62) 




*  0.470  0.659  0.779  0.696  1.142
**  1.100
*  0.214 
  (1.99)  (1.79)  (1.79)  (1.99)  (0.78)  (1.14)  (1.31)  (1.13)  (2.04)  (1.87)  (0.39) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.287  -0.149  -0.261  -0.161  0.133  -0.016  0.194  0.137  -0.762  -0.971
**  -0.276 
  (-1.00)  (-0.45)  (-0.79)  (-0.64)  (0.63)  (-0.06)  (0.80)  (0.56)  (-1.39)  (-2.29)  (-1.09) 
                       
Number of observations  900  890  890  890  777  777  777  777  890  900  777 
Adjusted R
2  0.1331  0.1529  0.1325  0.2089  0.2281  0.1509  0.1633  0.1726  0.1409  0.1517  0.1663 
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Table 4, continued. 
  Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. 














law  Ownership 
                       
Constant  -0.038  -0.136  -0.161  -0.241
**  -0.353
***  -0.179  -0.333
**  -0.271
*  -0.041  0.196  0.053 
  (-0.31)  (-0.99)  (-0.86)  (-2.07)  (-2.70)  (-1.42)  (-2.03)  (-1.90)  (-0.35)  (0.94)  (0.34) 
Institutions variable    0.114





***  0.001  0.051
*  -0.217
* 
    (2.70)  (1.24)  (4.54)  (3.28)  (2.00)  (2.18)  (2.77)  (0.45)  (1.76)  (-1.74) 












  (4.29)  (4.21)  (4.11)  (4.37)  (3.82)  (3.88)  (3.71)  (3.79)  (4.29)  (4.68)  (3.83) 












  (2.99)  (3.05)  (3.29)  (2.96)  (2.51)  (2.73)  (2.59)  (2.61)  (3.04)  (2.56)  (2.62) 
Market cap / GDP  0.090
***  0.054
**  0.073







  (2.85)  (2.01)  (2.54)  (1.01)  (1.10)  (2.41)  (2.26)  (1.86)  (2.90)  (2.90)  (2.65) 
Market turnover  0.051  0.054  0.050  0.052  0.025  0.033  0.038  0.034  0.053  0.051  0.021 
  (1.53)  (1.46)  (1.47)  (1.62)  (0.74)  (0.95)  (1.01)  (0.91)  (1.58)  (1.52)  (0.65) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.021  -0.012  -0.019  -0.015  -0.005  -0.011  0.000  -0.004  -0.030  -0.049
**  -0.019 
  (-1.50)  (-0.81)  (-1.19)  (-1.21)  (-0.40)  (-0.93)  (0.01)  (-0.33)  (-1.18)  (-2.06)  (-1.63) 
                       
Number of observations  901  890  890  890  777  777  777  777  890  901  777 
Adjusted R
2  0.1084  0.1436  0.1244  0.1895  0.1571  0.1217  0.1347  0.1340  0.1147  0.1156  0.1172 
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Table 5. Determinants of domestic IPO activity: 1990s vs. 2000s. 
The dependent variable is each country‟s annual measure of domestic IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 23,907 domestic IPOs from 
54 countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, 
domestic IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual 
domestic IPO count scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s 
annual domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. Domestic IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of global IPOs. 
Both measures of domestic IPO activity are multiplied by 100 and are winsorized at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles. Country-years with no data for the 
number of domestic firms or GDP are excluded. In Panel a (Panel b), the world domestic IPO rate is based on counts (proceeds). With the 
exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Post 2000 is a dummy that equals one from 2000 to 2007. Variables are 
defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are 
independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms. 














law  Ownership 
                       





**  0.839  4.885  3.619 
  (-0.12)  (-0.71)  (-0.32)  (-2.06)  (-3.45)  (-1.81)  (-2.77)  (-2.50)  (0.32)  (1.38)  (1.35) 
Post 2000  -0.764
**  -0.051  -0.283  0.642  2.487
***  0.528  0.769  1.280
*  -3.620  -0.463  -0.360 
  (-2.23)  (-0.16)  (-0.16)  (1.23)  (2.79)  (0.82)  (1.10)  (1.76)  (-1.41)  (-0.95)  (-0.25) 
Institutions variable    2.483





***  0.045  1.070
**  -7.181
** 
    (2.43)  (0.41)  (3.87)  (5.05)  (2.11)  (2.91)  (3.26)  (0.91)  (2.07)  (-2.68) 
Institutions × Post 2000    -1.987





**  0.039  0.118  -0.363 
    (-2.12)  (-0.25)  (-1.71)  (-2.75)  (-1.70)  (-1.75)  (-2.26)  (1.17)  (0.28)  (-0.14) 












  (3.89)  (3.72)  (3.74)  (3.67)  (3.38)  (3.39)  (3.33)  (3.30)  (3.95)  (3.93)  (3.44) 












  (3.04)  (3.27)  (3.25)  (3.14)  (2.61)  (2.67)  (2.44)  (2.59)  (2.99)  (2.87)  (2.58) 
Market cap / GDP  1.052




  (1.97)  (1.03)  (1.62)  (-0.00)  (-0.25)  (1.49)  (1.52)  (0.95)  (1.76)  (1.72)  (1.70) 




**  0.539  0.730  0.817  0.780  1.186
**  1.114
*  0.259 
  (2.15)  (2.12)  (2.00)  (2.11)  (0.95)  (1.37)  (1.47)  (1.39)  (2.29)  (1.95)  (0.50) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.284  -0.148  -0.262  -0.159  0.120  -0.016  0.187  0.130  -0.758  -0.917
**  -0.268 
  (-0.99)  (-0.45)  (-0.79)  (-0.64)  (0.56)  (-0.07)  (0.77)  (0.53)  (-1.39)  (-2.17)  (-1.06) 
                       
Number of observations  900  890  890  890  777  777  777  777  890  900  777 
Adjusted R
2  0.1374  0.1655  0.1352  0.2128  0.2408  0.1585  0.1721  0.1858  0.1467  0.1511  0.1670 
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Table 5, continued. 
  Panel b. Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP. 














law  Ownership 
                       
Constant  -0.002  -0.118  -0.185  -0.271
**  -0.372
***  -0.180  -0.311
*  -0.270
*  0.001  0.121  0.080 
  (-0.02)  (-0.85)  (-0.88)  (-2.41)  (-2.90)  (-1.45)  (-1.83)  (-1.87)  (0.01)  (0.61)  (0.52) 
Post 2000  -0.074
***  -0.019  0.085  0.088
**  0.135
**  0.035  0.015  0.062  -0.079  -0.038  -0.154
*** 
  (-3.17)  (-1.07)  (1.19)  (2.34)  (2.49)  (0.99)  (0.36)  (1.64)  (-0.61)  (-1.35)  (-3.69) 
Institutions variable    0.176





***  0.001  0.048  -0.238 
    (3.54)  (1.49)  (4.74)  (3.73)  (2.90)  (2.40)  (3.39)  (0.38)  (1.60)  (-1.65) 







***  0.000  -0.032  0.175 
    (-3.20)  (-2.06)  (-3.27)  (-2.98)  (-2.98)  (-1.82)  (-3.01)  (0.07)  (-1.46)  (1.53) 












  (4.50)  (4.47)  (4.39)  (4.61)  (4.09)  (4.11)  (3.97)  (4.08)  (4.49)  (4.59)  (4.05) 












  (2.90)  (2.99)  (3.19)  (2.92)  (2.33)  (2.58)  (2.36)  (2.38)  (2.94)  (2.70)  (2.51) 
Market cap / GDP  0.103
***  0.068
**  0.087








  (3.14)  (2.46)  (2.90)  (1.57)  (1.72)  (2.87)  (2.65)  (2.37)  (3.15)  (3.17)  (2.98) 




*  0.036  0.044  0.046  0.046  0.060
*  0.058
*  0.036 
  (1.81)  (1.95)  (1.86)  (1.82)  (1.11)  (1.33)  (1.30)  (1.32)  (1.85)  (1.75)  (1.10) 
Log (GDP / capita)  -0.021  -0.013  -0.020  -
0.015cd27
062002 
-0.007  -0.012  -0.002  -0.006  -0.030  -0.040
*  -0.018 
  (-1.55)  (-0.89)  (-1.25)  (-1.30)  (-0.58)  (-1.03)  (-0.13)  (-0.47)  (-1.23)  (-1.74)  (-1.59) 
                       
Number of observations  901  890  890  890  777  777  777  777  890  901  777 
Adjusted R
2  0.1236  0.1680  0.1423  0.2109  0.1784  0.1445  0.1524  0.1578  0.1278  0.1272  0.1317 
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Table 6. Determinants of global IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
The dependent variable is each country‟s annual measure of global IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 5,143 global IPOs from 54 
countries that have data available for GDP and country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, 
global IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual global 
IPO count scaled by the total number of IPOs that year. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual global 
IPO proceeds scaled by the total number of IPO proceeds that year. Global IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of the 
IPO. Both measures of global IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The dependent variable is set to missing if there are no IPOs in a given country 
in a given year. In Panel a (Panel b), the world IPO rates are based on counts (proceeds). The domestic IPO rate and world domestic IPO rate 
include total domestic proceeds in panel b. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Variables are 
defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on countries – they are computed assuming observations are 
independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Global IPO counts scaled by total number of IPOs. 














law  Ownership 
                       
Constant  -7.172  13.275  34.991  16.058  38.455  -1.120  1.628  11.187  -6.444  -33.104  -85.898
** 
  (-0.22)  (0.39)  (1.03)  (0.46)  (1.00)  (-0.03)  (0.04)  (0.30)  (-0.20)  (-0.91)  (-2.43) 




***  -12.280  -12.291  -24.561
**  0.163  -6.962  97.302
*** 
    (-2.62)  (-2.83)  (-2.52)  (-4.33)  (-1.18)  (-0.73)  (-2.44)  (0.45)  (-1.67)  (6.14) 












  (-5.91)  (-5.85)  (-7.21)  (-5.26)  (-5.98)  (-6.79)  (-6.43)  (-6.56)  (-6.33)  (-5.57)  (-6.12) 












  (1.78)  (2.12)  (2.32)  (2.04)  (1.76)  (1.77)  (1.72)  (1.85)  (2.06)  (2.27)  (2.36) 












  (3.36)  (3.20)  (3.40)  (3.26)  (2.60)  (3.00)  (3.02)  (2.86)  (3.53)  (3.03)  (2.89) 
Country q  6.804  5.758  1.000  4.214  4.976  8.721  8.875  8.566  6.551  8.102  9.748 
  (1.14)  (0.90)  (0.17)  (0.64)  (0.78)  (1.39)  (1.28)  (1.28)  (1.06)  (1.35)  (1.54) 
Global q  9.247  6.204  10.940  7.544  4.197  5.327  6.975  5.207  9.250  5.372  0.708 
  (0.40)  (0.26)  (0.47)  (0.32)  (0.16)  (0.21)  (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.40)  (0.23)  (0.03) 
Market cap / GDP  -5.588  0.160  0.307  -0.323  4.860  -1.687  -1.660  0.869  -5.200  -5.278  -2.182 
  (-1.34)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (-0.07)  (1.19)  (-0.44)  (-0.39)  (0.22)  (-1.22)  (-1.34)  (-0.65) 










**  -0.297 
  (-2.55)  (-2.76)  (-2.39)  (-2.54)  (-2.87)  (-3.20)  (-3.12)  (-3.14)  (-2.20)  (-2.61)  (-0.15) 
Log (GDP / capita)  3.922
*  2.340  2.277  2.915  2.690  4.031
**  3.540
*  3.201
*  2.303  7.761
**  7.670
*** 
  (1.97)  (1.25)  (1.26)  (1.39)  (1.41)  (2.14)  (1.79)  (1.76)  (0.65)  (2.54)  (5.11) 
                       
Number of observations  707  698  698  698  632  632  632  632  698  707  632 
Adjusted R
2  0.2389  0.2668  0.2712  0.2557  0.3007  0.2606  0.2593  0.2729  0.2353  0.2444  0.3369 
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Table 6, continued. 
  Panel b. Global IPO proceeds scaled by total IPO proceeds. 














law  Ownership 
                       
Constant  -25.853  -12.674  -5.988  -12.060  6.027  -24.754  -29.327  -17.083  -22.337  -67.968
*  -102.094
*** 
  (-0.92)  (-0.42)  (-0.20)  (-0.40)  (0.19)  (-0.79)  (-0.89)  (-0.56)  (-0.78)  (-2.00)  (-3.08) 




***  -11.377  -2.972  -18.615
**  -0.264  -8.643
**  78.190
*** 
    (-1.97)  (-1.98)  (-1.95)  (-3.99)  (-1.10)  (-0.20)  (-2.06)  (-0.74)  (-2.45)  (5.26) 












  (-4.12)  (-4.05)  (-4.62)  (-3.95)  (-4.24)  (-4.53)  (-4.20)  (-4.37)  (-4.24)  (-3.84)  (-4.32) 
World domestic IPO rate  8.110  9.446  12.227  10.406  7.778  11.897  12.431  10.360  14.306  11.988  11.894 
  (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.67)  (0.57)  (0.41)  (0.62)  (0.65)  (0.55)  (0.77)  (0.67)  (0.65) 










*  32.786 
  (2.71)  (2.42)  (2.32)  (2.36)  (1.71)  (1.99)  (2.07)  (1.93)  (2.42)  (1.73)  (1.49) 
Country q  -4.152  -4.056  -6.577  -4.917  -5.257  -2.866  -2.595  -2.780  -3.173  -2.002  -1.034 
  (-0.72)  (-0.69)  (-1.16)  (-0.80)  (-0.94)  (-0.48)  (-0.42)  (-0.46)  (-0.57)  (-0.36)  (-0.20) 












  (2.00)  (2.00)  (2.15)  (2.05)  (2.00)  (1.99)  (1.96)  (1.98)  (2.01)  (2.14)  (2.02) 
Market cap / GDP  0.279  4.618  3.869  4.134  8.935
**  3.380  2.272  5.003  1.276  0.740  3.114 
  (0.07)  (1.07)  (0.90)  (0.97)  (2.24)  (0.83)  (0.54)  (1.21)  (0.34)  (0.20)  (1.07) 












  (-6.30)  (-6.32)  (-6.27)  (-6.48)  (-5.36)  (-6.30)  (-5.99)  (-6.32)  (-6.44)  (-6.38)  (-2.43) 
Log (GDP / capita)  2.814
*  1.347  1.577  1.708  1.167  2.340  2.389  1.741  4.005  7.550
***  5.238
*** 
  (1.73)  (0.83)  (1.03)  (1.03)  (0.69)  (1.38)  (1.37)  (1.02)  (1.32)  (2.89)  (3.85) 
                       
Number of observations  711  700  700  700  633  633  633  633  700  711  633 
Adjusted R
2  0.1289  0.1405  0.1339  0.1326  0.1690  0.1297  0.1234  0.1371  0.1232  0.1402  0.1958 
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Table 7. Determinants of global IPO activity: 1990s vs. 2000s. 
The dependent variable is each country‟s annual measure of global IPO activity. IPO data is from SDC and includes 5,143 global IPOs from 54 
countries that have data available for GDP and for country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. For each country, 
global IPO counts and proceeds are summed annually. Panel a shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual global 
IPO count scaled by the total number of IPOs that year. Panel b shows regressions where the dependent variable is each country‟s annual global 
IPO proceeds scaled by the total number of IPO proceeds that year. Global IPO proceeds do not include proceeds from the domestic tranche of the 
IPO. Both measures of global IPO activity are multiplied by 100. The dependent variable is set to missing if there are no IPOs in a given country 
in a given year. In Panel a (Panel b), the world IPO rates are based on counts (proceeds). The domestic IPO rate and world domestic IPO rate 
include total domestic proceeds in panel b. With the exception of the institutions variables, all variables are lagged by one year. Post 2000 is a 
dummy that equals one from 2000 to 2007. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering on 
countries – they are computed assuming observations are independent across countries, but not within countries. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Panel a. Global IPO counts scaled by total number of IPOs. 














law  Ownership 
                        Constant  -3.395  21.830  53.654  27.043  52.111  5.877  7.224  20.487  5.804  -28.284  -81.175
** 
  (-0.10)  (0.64)  (1.59)  (0.78)  (1.33)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.56)  (0.17)  (-0.79)  (-2.32) 
Post 2000  -2.224  -7.851
**  -27.435
***  -13.126
**  -8.325  0.139  1.946  -3.098  -17.304  -9.686
**  6.700 
  (-0.68)  (-2.49)  (-3.05)  (-2.34)  (-1.04)  (0.02)  (0.33)  (-0.58)  (-0.94)  (-2.41)  (0.96) 




***  -9.146  -7.438  -23.778
*  0.078  -10.889
**  113.669
*** 
    (-2.82)  (-3.37)  (-2.98)  (-3.73)  (-0.70)  (-0.38)  (-1.73)  (0.20)  (-2.29)  (6.30) 
Institutions × Post 2000    9.011  6.188
**  16.149
*  3.005  -8.881  -11.503  -3.963  0.179  4.622  -31.340
** 
    (1.55)  (2.58)  (1.77)  (0.24)  (-0.77)  (-0.90)  (-0.34)  (0.73)  (1.44)  (-2.38) 












  (-5.92)  (-5.91)  (-7.51)  (-5.26)  (-6.10)  (-6.85)  (-6.41)  (-6.56)  (-6.40)  (-5.79)  (-6.23) 
World domestic IPO rate  0.769  0.599  0.656  0.617  0.332  0.536  0.570  0.517  0.718  0.694  0.493 
  (1.27)  (1.03)  (1.12)  (1.04)  (0.54)  (0.87)  (0.91)  (0.84)  (1.21)  (1.16)  (0.77) 












  (3.44)  (3.40)  (3.61)  (3.46)  (2.90)  (3.22)  (3.22)  (3.09)  (3.76)  (3.15)  (3.26) 
Country q  6.962  6.421  2.555  4.960  5.127  8.556  8.517  8.520  6.500  8.288  10.176 
  (1.17)  (1.02)  (0.44)  (0.76)  (0.80)  (1.35)  (1.23)  (1.26)  (1.07)  (1.41)  (1.65) 
Global q  7.277  2.853  5.918  3.698  -1.857  0.766  2.984  0.221  6.866  0.869  -5.993 
  (0.32)  (0.12)  (0.26)  (0.16)  (-0.07)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.01)  (0.30)  (0.04)  (-0.22) 
Market cap / GDP  -5.337  0.718  0.973  0.266  5.933  -0.866  -0.916  1.772  -4.869  -4.923  -1.345 
  (-1.26)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (0.06)  (1.45)  (-0.23)  (-0.21)  (0.47)  (-1.13)  (-1.26)  (-0.38) 










**  -0.136 
  (-2.49)  (-2.78)  (-2.41)  (-2.42)  (-2.61)  (-2.99)  (-2.95)  (-2.93)  (-2.06)  (-2.54)  (-0.07) 
Log (GDP / capita)  3.937
*  2.343  2.330  2.964  2.676  4.019
**  3.517
*  3.173
*  2.289  8.730
***  7.788
*** 
  (1.98)  (1.25)  (1.30)  (1.41)  (1.39)  (2.13)  (1.79)  (1.74)  (0.64)  (2.86)  (5.22) 
                        Number of observations  707  698  698  698  632  632  632  632  698  707  632 
Adjusted R
2  0.2383  0.2701  0.2788  0.2584  0.3027  0.2612  0.2598  0.2734  0.2353  0.2475  0.3434 
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Table 7, continued. 
  Panel b. Global IPO proceeds scaled by total IPO proceeds. 














law  Ownership 
                       
Constant  -25.990  3.213  14.429  5.628  42.246  -1.004  -12.374  9.798  -9.960  -54.112  -72.879
* 
  (-0.75)  (0.09)  (0.40)  (0.16)  (1.21)  (-0.03)  (-0.33)  (0.30)  (-0.28)  (-1.41)  (-1.97) 
Post 2000  0.027  -6.390  -16.827  -12.182
**  -14.461
*  -6.222  0.551  -6.359  -14.827  -6.239  6.506 
  (0.01)  (-1.52)  (-1.66)  (-2.08)  (-1.83)  (-0.98)  (0.09)  (-1.11)  (-0.73)  (-1.09)  (1.13) 




***  -13.665  0.299  -20.891
*  -0.340  -11.043
***  94.971
*** 
    (-2.66)  (-2.62)  (-2.88)  (-4.24)  (-1.13)  (0.02)  (-1.89)  (-0.86)  (-2.81)  (6.37) 
Institutions × Post 2000    10.110
**  3.906  18.050
*  12.163  3.324  -8.125  2.514  0.177  3.346  -31.568
** 
    (2.04)  (1.56)  (1.99)  (1.09)  (0.31)  (-0.81)  (0.23)  (0.69)  (1.02)  (-2.55) 












  (-4.04)  (-3.85)  (-4.59)  (-3.57)  (-4.14)  (-4.49)  (-4.17)  (-4.23)  (-4.23)  (-3.85)  (-4.30) 
World domestic IPO rate  8.171  1.366  4.847  2.864  -7.322  1.965  4.957  -0.817  11.530  3.872  -5.919 
  (0.38)  (0.06)  (0.21)  (0.13)  (-0.33)  (0.09)  (0.21)  (-0.04)  (0.50)  (0.18)  (-0.27) 









*  52.661  70.824
** 
  (1.76)  (2.20)  (2.02)  (2.06)  (2.42)  (2.21)  (1.98)  (2.30)  (1.85)  (1.62)  (2.52) 
Country q  -4.151  -3.845  -5.998  -4.633  -5.208  -3.127  -3.159  -3.067  -3.574  -2.393  -1.315 
  (-0.72)  (-0.67)  (-1.05)  (-0.75)  (-0.90)  (-0.52)  (-0.51)  (-0.50)  (-0.64)  (-0.44)  (-0.26) 
Global q  40.626  30.771  34.067  32.681  21.513  27.149  30.576  25.564  37.984  33.940  20.651 
  (1.60)  (1.27)  (1.35)  (1.30)  (0.90)  (1.13)  (1.19)  (1.07)  (1.51)  (1.33)  (0.85) 
Market cap / GDP  0.276  4.799  4.114  4.279  9.706
**  3.914  2.899  5.688  1.317  0.824  3.871 
  (0.07)  (1.14)  (0.97)  (1.01)  (2.47)  (0.97)  (0.68)  (1.38)  (0.35)  (0.22)  (1.30) 












  (-6.19)  (-6.54)  (-6.21)  (-6.17)  (-4.92)  (-5.94)  (-5.65)  (-5.92)  (-6.22)  (-5.98)  (-2.36) 
Log (GDP / capita)  2.814
*  1.320  1.612  1.734  1.145  2.314  2.336  1.677  3.923  7.993
***  5.305
*** 
  (1.73)  (0.81)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (0.66)  (1.35)  (1.33)  (0.97)  (1.30)  (3.01)  (3.88) 
                       
Number of observations  711  700  700  700  633  633  633  633  700  711  633 
Adjusted R
2  0.1277  0.1437  0.1357  0.1349  0.1720  0.1292  0.1227  0.1370  0.1217  0.1403  0.2031 
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Figure 1. Total IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
This figure shows annual IPO activity for all countries (World), the U.S., U.K., and China from 1990 to 
2007. IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries over the period from 1990 to 
2007. Panel a shows the total number of IPOs (domestic and global) each year. Panel b shows total IPO 















































































































































































Figure 2. U.S. and world IPO activity: 1990 to 2007. 
This figure shows annual IPO activity for the U.S. and all countries (World) from 1990 to 2007. IPO data 
is from SDC and includes 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries. Panel a shows the total number of IPOs 
(domestic and global) scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms each year. Panel b shows total IPO 
proceeds raised (domestic and global) scaled by lagged GDP each year. Proceeds are in constant 2007 






















































































Panel a. IPO counts.
U.S. counts/listed firms
World counts/listed firms






















































































Figure 3. The U.S. share of world IPO activity. 
This figure shows annual share of IPO activity for U.S. firms relative to firms in the rest of the world 
from 1990 to 2007. IPO data is from SDC and includes 29,361 IPOs from 89 countries. Panel a shows the 
number of U.S. IPOs scaled by the number of IPOs by firms from the rest of the world. Panel b shows 
IPO proceeds raised by U.S. firms scaled by IPO proceeds raised by firms from the rest of the world. 























































































Panel a. IPO counts.
U.S. share of domestic IPOs
U.S. share of global IPOs


















































































Panel b. IPO Proceeds.
U.S. share of proceeds in 
domestic IPOs
U.S. share of total IPO 
domestic proceeds
U.S. share of total 
proceeds in global IPOs
U.S. share of global 
proceeds
U.S. share of total IPO 
proceeds51 
Appendix A. Summary statistics and correlations for country-level variables. 
This table shows the average values of the country variables. The sample is restricted to 54 countries that have data available for GDP and for 
country q for at least one year during the sample period from 1990 to 2007. Each variable is averaged across years within a given country and is 
then averaged across countries. 






                  
Domestic IPO counts scaled by the lagged number of domestic firms  54  2.567  1.317  2.879  0.019  11.959  0.366  3.929 
Domestic IPO proceeds scaled by lagged GDP  54  0.140  0.094  0.142  0.000  0.628  0.040  0.174 
Global IPO counts scaled by total number of IPOs  54  47.924  49.284  26.626  1.678  92.941  25.000  69.608 
Global IPO proceeds scaled by total IPO proceeds  54  45.702  44.591  20.764  6.487  94.077  32.816  57.460 
World domestic IPO rate (counts)  54  3.686  3.735  0.225  2.353  3.944  3.710  3.750 
World domestic IPO rate (proceeds)  54  0.153  0.153  0.003  0.142  0.161  0.153  0.154 
World domestic IPO rate (total domestic proceeds)  54  0.244  0.244  0.004  0.222  0.255  0.244  0.245 
World global IPO rate (counts)  54  0.741  0.734  0.027  0.676  0.821  0.729  0.742 
World global IPO rate (proceeds)  54  0.117  0.117  0.006  0.104  0.151  0.116  0.117 
Domestic IPO rate (counts)  54  2.490  1.169  2.849  0.000  12.271  0.347  3.879 
Domestic IPO rate (total domestic proceeds)  54  0.205  0.152  0.179  0.004  0.890  0.070  0.265 
Common law  53  0.302  0.000  0.463  0.000  1.000  0.000  1.000 
Anti-director  53  3.443  3.500  1.121  1.000  5.000  3.000  4.000 
Anti-self dealing  53  0.484  0.440  0.240  0.092  1.000  0.288  0.642 
Disclosure  45  0.624  0.580  0.209  0.170  1.000  0.500  0.750 
Burden of proof  45  0.487  0.440  0.252  0.000  1.000  0.220  0.660 
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Appendix A, continued. 






                 
Public enforcement  45  0.517  0.550  0.223  0.000  0.900  0.333  0.667 
Investor protection  45  0.481  0.465  0.234  0.000  1.000  0.355  0.610 
Political risk  53  73.498  75.685  11.616  47.468  92.382  66.067  83.519 
Rule of law  54  0.763  0.856  0.925  -1.040  1.986  -0.010  1.643 
Ownership  45  0.462  0.510  0.132  0.180  0.670  0.390  0.560 
Country q  54  1.279  1.294  0.189  0.884  1.847  1.177  1.362 
Global q  54  1.258  1.258  0.000  1.258  1.258  1.258  1.258 
Market cap / GDP  54  0.594  0.429  0.515  0.072  2.587  0.220  0.815 
Market turnover  54  0.588  0.482  0.494  0.016  2.745  0.234  0.722 
Log (GDP / capita)  54  8.884  9.284  1.377  6.082  10.782  7.967  10.134 
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Appendix A, continued. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22)  (23)  (24)  (25)  (26) 
                                                      Dom IPO counts / lagged # of dom 
firms (1)  1.00                                                   
Dom IPO proceeds / lagged GDP (2)  0.79  1.00                                                 
Global IPO counts / total # if IPOs (3)  -0.75  -0.67  1.00                                               
Global IPO proceeds / total IPO 
proceeds (4)  -0.56  -0.50  0.86  1.00                                             
World dom IPO rate (counts) (5)  -0.40  -0.21  0.24  0.10  1.00                                           
World dom IPO rate (proceeds) (6)  -0.33  -0.50  0.43  0.39  0.19  1.00                                         
World dom IPO rate (total dom 
proceeds) (7)  -0.23  -0.34  0.27  0.30  0.11  0.84  1.00                                       
World global IPO rate (counts) (8)  0.10  0.05  -0.14  -0.07  -0.67  0.02  0.31  1.00                                     
World global IPO rate (proceeds) (9)  0.14  0.01  -0.16  -0.31  -0.09  -0.36  -0.48  -0.22  1.00                                   
Dom IPO rate (counts) (10)  1.00  0.79  -0.75  -0.56  -0.41  -0.34  -0.24  0.10  0.13  1.00                                 
Dom IPO rate (total dom proceeds) (11)  0.71  0.92  -0.56  -0.43  -0.18  -0.41  -0.38  -0.06  0.01  0.71  1.00                               
Common law (12)  0.38  0.48  -0.41  -0.32  -0.38  -0.46  -0.41  0.16  0.01  0.39  0.44  1.00                             
Anti-director (13)  0.34  0.39  -0.34  -0.20  -0.27  -0.15  -0.02  0.35  -0.09  0.35  0.39  0.54  1.00                           
Anti-self dealing (14)  0.50  0.60  -0.30  -0.16  -0.28  -0.38  -0.34  0.07  0.03  0.51  0.61  0.72  0.64  1.00                         
Disclosure (15)  0.62  0.62  -0.50  -0.45  -0.35  -0.41  -0.42  0.06  0.24  0.62  0.62  0.64  0.50  0.64  1.00                       
Burden of proof (16)  0.38  0.37  -0.23  -0.17  -0.20  -0.55  -0.45  0.05  0.26  0.38  0.40  0.34  0.39  0.37  0.49  1.00                     
Public enforcement (17)  0.35  0.39  -0.23  -0.08  -0.14  -0.35  -0.51  -0.23  0.05  0.35  0.43  0.40  0.13  0.37  0.44  0.34  1.00                   
Investor protection (18)  0.46  0.47  -0.34  -0.23  -0.28  -0.57  -0.56  0.04  0.21  0.46  0.50  0.58  0.50  0.58  0.62  0.79  0.71  1.00                 
Political risk (19)  0.19  0.14  0.10  0.10  -0.07  0.01  -0.08  -0.18  0.17  0.17  0.30  -0.13  0.00  0.14  0.13  0.17  -0.23  -0.01  1.00               
Rule of law (20)  0.24  0.18  0.04  0.04  -0.12  -0.02  -0.13  -0.14  0.18  0.23  0.34  0.04  0.13  0.27  0.26  0.23  -0.16  0.11  0.92  1.00             
Ownership (21)  -0.44  -0.28  0.44  0.46  0.26  0.37  0.34  -0.09  -0.37  -0.42  -0.33  -0.16  -0.24  -0.25  -0.43  -0.38  -0.04  -0.36  -0.47  -0.51  1.00           
Country q (22)  0.09  -0.04  -0.01  -0.08  -0.18  -0.15  -0.19  0.10  0.13  0.10  -0.06  0.11  -0.07  0.00  0.17  0.10  0.04  0.12  -0.07  0.07  -0.09  1.00         
Global q (23)  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .       
Market cap / GDP (24)  0.36  0.53  -0.14  -0.03  -0.03  -0.28  -0.28  -0.17  0.02  0.37  0.59  0.36  0.35  0.52  0.59  0.40  0.26  0.46  0.38  0.41  -0.30  -0.01  .  1.00     
Market turnover (25)  0.43  0.31  -0.30  -0.38  -0.13  -0.14  -0.13  0.05  0.20  0.42  0.22  -0.05  0.09  0.01  0.21  0.16  -0.04  0.08  0.12  0.18  -0.57  0.21  .  0.05  1.00   
Log (GDP / capita) (26)  0.13  0.06  0.18  0.22  0.04  0.05  -0.08  -0.32  0.22  0.11  0.22  -0.14  -0.03  0.15  0.06  0.13  -0.21  -0.03  0.91  0.87  -0.44  -0.11  .  0.37  0.17  1.00 
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Appendix B. Variable definitions. 
IPO data is from SDC‟s Global New Issues Database. IPO proceeds are in constant 2007 U.S. dollars. Country-level variables are from the World 
Bank‟s WDI Database, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), International 
Country Risk Guide database, the World Bank‟s World Governance Indicators database, and the 2008 update of the Financial Development and 
Structure database, originally used in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000). Data to compute Tobin‟s q is from Worldscope. 
Variable  Definition 
   
Domestic IPO counts / lagged # of domestic firms  Number of domestic IPOs in country j in year t / number of domestic listed firms in country j in year t-1 and is multiplied by 
100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
Domestic IPO proceeds / lagged GDP  Proceeds raised in domestic IPOs in country j in year t / GDP for country j in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. Source: SDC 
and WDI database. 
Global IPO counts / total number of IPOs  Number of global IPOs in country j in year t / the total number of IPOs in country j in year t and is multiplied by 100. Source: 
SDC.  
Global IPO proceeds / total IPO proceeds  Global IPO proceeds raised in country j in year t / total IPO proceeds raised in country j in year t and is multiplied by 100. 
Global IPO proceeds include proceeds raised in the international tranches only. Source: SDC. 
World domestic IPO rate (counts)  Total world domestic IPO counts in year t / total number of domestic listed firms worldwide in year t-1 and is multiplied by 
100. To compute the world domestic IPO rate for country j, domestic IPOs and the number of domestic listed firms for 
country j are excluded from the calculation. Used in Tables 4 and 5. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
World domestic IPO rate (proceeds)  Total world proceeds raised in domestic IPOs in year t / total worldwide GDP in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. To 
compute the world domestic IPO rate for country j, IPO proceeds and GDP for country j are excluded from the calculation. 
Used in Tables 4 and 5. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
World domestic IPO rate (total domestic proceeds)  Total world domestic IPO proceeds in year t / total worldwide GDP in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. Total world 
domestic IPO proceeds include proceeds raised in domestic IPOs and the domestic component of global IPOs. To compute 
the world domestic IPO rate for country j, IPO proceeds and GDP for country j are excluded from the calculation. Used in 
Tables 6 and 7. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
World global IPO rate (counts)  Total world global IPO counts in year t / total number of domestic listed firms worldwide in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. 
To compute the world global IPO rate for country j, global IPOs and the number of domestic listed firms for country j are 
excluded from the calculation. Used in Tables 6 and 7. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
World global IPO rate (proceeds)  Total world global proceeds raised in year t / total worldwide GDP in year t-1 and is multiplied by 100. Total world global 
proceeds include proceeds raised in international tranches only. To compute the world global IPO rate for country j, IPO 
proceeds and GDP for country j are excluded from the calculation. Used in Tables 6 and 7. Source: SDC and WDI database.  
Domestic IPO rate (counts)  Lagged domestic IPO counts / lagged # of domestic firms and is multiplied by 100. Source: SDC and WDI database. 
Domestic IPO rate (total domestic proceeds)  Lagged domestic IPO proceeds / lagged GDP and is multiplied by 100. For this variable, proceeds include total domestic 
proceeds, including proceeds raised in domestic IPOs and the domestic component of global IPOs. Source: SDC and WDI 
database. 
Post 2000  Equals one from 2000 to 2007; and zero otherwise. 
Common law  Equals one if a country‟s origin of commercial law is English common law, and zero otherwise. Source: DLLS (2008).  
   
   55 
Appendix B, continued. 
Variable  Definition 
   
Anti-director  The index is formed by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; 
(5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting. Ranges from zero to six. Source: DLLS (2008). 
Anti-self dealing  Average of ex ante and ex post private control of self-dealing, where ex ante is the average of approval by disinterested 
shareholders and ex ante disclosure; ex post is the average of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing. 
Ranges from zero to one. Source: DLLS (2008). 
Disclosure  Arithmetic mean of (1) prospectus; (2) compensation; (3) shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) contracts irregular; and (6) 
transactions. Ranges from zero to one.  Source: LLS (2006). 
Burden of proof  Arithmetic mean of (1) liability standard for the issuer and its directors; (2) liability standard for distributors; and (3) liability 
standard for accountants. Ranges from zero to one. Source: LLS (2006). 
Public enforcement  Arithmetic mean of (1) supervisor characteristics index; (2) rule-making power index; (3) investigative powers index; (4) 
orders index; and (5) criminal index. Ranges from zero to one. Source: LLS (2006). 
Investor protection  Principal component of disclosure, burden of proof, and anti-director rights. Ranges from zero to one. Source: LLS (2006). 
Political risk  Includes 12 weighted variables covering both political and social attributes. Ranges from zero to 100. Source: ICRG. 
Rule of law  Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Ranges from -1.6753 to 2.0431. Source: 2009 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators database. 
Ownership  Average percentage of common shares owned by the top three shareholders in the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned 
domestic firms in a given country. Source: LLSV (1998). 
Country q  For each firm in country j q is computed annually as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
/ book value of total assets (all variables in local currency). For each country, median industry qs are computed annually 
using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme. The industry qs are then weighted by their relative market values 
each year so that country q is the market value weighted average of the median industry qs. Source: Worldscope. 
Global q  For each firm in country j q is computed annually as total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
/ book value of total assets (all variables in local currency).  Global median industry q’s are computed across all firms 
worldwide using the Fama-French 17 industry classification scheme. To compute global q, each global industry q is weighted 
by the industry‟s relative market value (in USD). Source: Worldscope. 
Market cap / GDP  Value of listed shares to GDP. Source: Financial Development and Structure database. 
Market turnover  Ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. Source: Financial Development and Structure 
database. 
Log (GDP / capita)  Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is in current U.S. dollars. Source: WDI database. 
   
 